c. 


REESE    LIBRARY 

OF  THK 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

Received .. 
Accessions  No.4f4 *£      Shelf  No. 


THE  TESTS 


VARIOUS  KINDS  OF  TRUTH 


BEING 


A  TREATISE  OF  APPLIED  LOGIC 


LECTURES 

DELIVERED    BEFORE    THE    OHIO   WESLEYAN 
UNIVERSITY 

ON  THE  MERRICK   FOUNDATION 


BY 
JAMES  MCCOSH,  D.D.,  LL.D.,  D.L. 

Ex-President  of  Princeton  College,  N.  J. 


NEW  YORK':  HUNT  &  EATON 

CINCINNA  77.-  CRANSTON  &>  STOIVE 

18S9 


Copyright,  1889,  by 

HUNT*     EATON, 

NEW  YORK. 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


distinguished  author  of  the  following  lectures 
needs  no  introduction  to  American  readers.  His 
eminent  services  as  an  educator,  and  his  still  more  emi- 
nent philosophical  writings,  have  given  him  a  world- 
wide reputation.  These  lectures  were  especially  prepared 
for  delivery  before  the  faculty  and  students  of  the  Ohio 
Wesleyan  University  on  the  foundation  indicated  on 
the  title-page.  This  foundation  contemplates  an  annual 
course  of  at  least  five  lectures  on  Experimental  and 
Practical  Religion.  A  previous  course,  by  the  late  Rev. 
Daniel  Curry,  treats  especially  of  the  importance  of  re- 
ligion in  the  higher  institutions  of  learning.  The  pres- 
ent course  is  deemed  eminently  appropriate  as  tending 
to  establish  the  foundations  of  the  belief  on  which  the 
entire  religious  life  must  rest.  That  the  lectures  are 
able  and  happily  adapted  to  meet  some  of  the  subtle 
forms  of  prevailing  unbelief  will  be  readily  admitted  by 
all  intelligent  readers.  They  are  given  to  the  public  in 
the  belief  that  they  will  be  eagerly  sought,  and  that 
their  wide  circulation  cannot  fail  to  accomplish  great 
good.  They  are  accompanied  with  the  prayer  that  such 
may  be  the  result.  The  next  course  will  be  delivered 
by  an  eminent  divine  upon  some  of  the  fundamental 
principles  of  Experimental  Religion. 

OHIO  WESLEYAN  UNMVERSITY, 
March  28,  /<£$?. 


PREFACE. 


rpHE  age  may  be  characterized  as  one  of  unsettled 
opinion.  Our  ambitious  youth  are  not  satis- 
fied with  the  past,  its  opinions,  and  practices.  Au- 
thority is  not  worshiped  by  them ;  they  have  no 
partiality  for  creeds  and  confessions.  They  do  not 
accept,  without  first  doubting,  the  truths  supposed 
to  be  long  established.  In  searching  into  the  foun- 
dation of  the  old  temples  they  have  raised  a  cloud 
of  dust  and  left  lying  a  heap  of  rubbish.  It  is  an 
age  out  of  which  good  and  evil,  either  or  both,  may 
come,  according  as  it  is  guided.  We  may  entertain 
fears,  for  it  is  dancing  on  the  edge  of  a  precipice 
down  which  it  may  fall.  We  may  cherish  hope,  for 
it  is  an  inquiring  age. 

Every  form  and  phase  of  opinion  seeks  to  have  a 
philosophy,  in  which  it  may  embody  and  express 
itself  and  by  which  it  maybe  defended.  Agnostics 
is  the  shape  or  figure  which  the  doubting  and  hesi- 
tating spirit  takes.  It  is  not  a  new  heresy.  It  has 
been  held  by  a  few  in  every  age  ;  it  is  now  espoused 
by  many,  provisionally,  till  something  more  solid  or 


6  Preface. 

showy  is  propounded.  It  used  to  be  called  nes- 
cience, which  maintains  that  nothing  can  be  known, 
and  nihilism,  which  holds  that  there  is  nothing  to 
be  known.  It  is  of  little  use  trying  to  argue  with 
it,  for  it  allows  us  no  premises  as  a  ground  on  which 
to  start,  and  has  no  body  or  substance  that  we  can 
attack.  It  is  easy  to  show  that  it  is  suicidal.  It  is 
an  evident  contradiction  to  affirm  that  we  know 
that  we  can  know  nothing.  But  when  we  have 
demonstrated  this  we  have  not  destroyed  it  any 
more  than  we  have  killed  a  specter  by  thrusting  a 
spear  into  it ;  for  its  defense  is  that  all  truth  is  con- 
tradictory. The  best  way  of  dealing  with  it  is  to 
allow  it  to  dance  as  it  may,  like  the  shadows  of  the 
clouds,  and,  meanwhile,  to  found  and  build  up  truth 
and  set  it  up  before  the  mind,  that  it  may  be  seen 
in  its  own  light.  It  is  well  known  that  when  we  see 
a  solid  object  through  and  beyond  a  specter  the 
specter  melts  away  and  disappears.  So  it  will  be 
with  agnosticism — it  will  vanish  when  we  fix  our 
eyes  upon  the  truth. 

But  meanwhile  an  immense  number  and  variety 
of  crude  views  and  opinions  on  the  most  moment- 
ous subjects,  such  as  morality  and  religion,  are  set 
before  the  young  and  pressed  upon  their  accept- 
ance. In  consequence  they  often  feel  a  difficulty  in 
knowing  what  to  believe,  and  they  may  be  led  to 


Preface.  1 

believe  too  little  or  too  much.  In  these  circum- 
stances it  is  of  vast  importance  to  provide  them 
with  tests  which  may  enable  them  to  distinguish 
between  truth  and  fiction  and  settle  them  in  the 
truth. 

This  is  what  is  attempted  in  this  work,  which  is 
meant  for  those  who  wish  for  their  own  satisfaction 
to  know  on  what  foundations  the  truths  on  which 
they  are  required  to  believe  rest. 

It  is  hoped,  being  a  treatise  on  what  Kant  calls 
applied  logic,  which  may  be  quite  as  useful  as  pri- 
mary or  formal  logic,  it  may  be  used  as  a  text-book. 


CONTENTS. 


LECTURE  FIRST. 

PAGE 

Truths  to  be  Assumed. .  n 


LECTURE   SECOND. 
Discursive  or  Deductive  Truth 27 

LECTURE  THIRD. 
Inductive  Truths 43 

LECTURE  FOURTH. 

The  Joint  Dogmatic  and  Deductive  Method.  The  Joint  In- 
ductive and  Deductive.  Hypotheses  and  Verification. 
Chance.  Induction  Cannot  Give  Absolute  Truth.  We 
Know  in  Part 79 

LECTURE   FIFTH. 
Testimony.     Is  it  Sufficient  to  Prove  the  Supernatural? 107 


INTRODUCION. 


WE  have  truth  when  our  ideas  are  conformed 
to  things.  The  aim  of  this  work  is  to  show 
that  there  is  truth,  that  truth  can  be  found,  and 
that  there  are  tests  by  which  we  may  determine 
when  we  have  found  it.  We  do  not  propose  to 
guide  inquirers  in  any  particular  department  of  in- 
vestigation ;  this  can  best  be  done  in  introductions 
to  the  books  and  lectures  treating  of  the  several 
branches  of  knowledge. 

Kant  and  the  German  metaphysicians  have  shown 
again  and  again  that  there  is  no  one  absolute  cri- 
terion to  settle  all  truth  for  us  ;  that  will  determine, 
for  example,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  whether 
there  is  a  fourth  dimension  of  space,  whether  the 
planet  Jupiter  is  inhabited,  where  the  soul  goes  at 
death,  and  what  kind  of  crops  we  are  to  have  next 
year.  But  it  can  be  shown  that  there  are  truths 
which  maybe  ascertained  and  that  there  are  criteria 
which  prove  when  they  are  so  ;  and  these  clear,  sure, 
and  capable  of  being  definitely  expressed.  But  the 
test  which  settles  one  truth  for  us  does  not  neces- 


10  Introduction. 

sarily  settle  all  others,  or  any  others.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  distinguish  between  different  sorts  of  truth, 
and  we  should  be  satisfied  when  we  find  a  test  of 
each  kind.  I  am  convinced  that  historical,  scien- 
tific, and  logical  investigation  has  advanced  so  far 
that  we  can  now  enunciate  criteria  for  every  kind 
of  truth.  The  aim  of  the  criteria,  it  should  be 
noticed,  is  not  so  much  to  help  us  to  discover  truth 
as  to  determine  when  we  have  found  it. 


LECTURE  FIRST. 

TRUTHS  TO   BE  ASSUMED. 

I. 

r~PHE  mind  must  start  with  something.  There 
JL  are  things  which  it  knows  at  once.  I  know 
pleasure  and  pain.  I  do  more:  I  know  myself  as 
feeling  pleasure  and  pain.  I  know  that  I  am  sur- 
rounded with  material  objects,  extended  and  exer- 
cising properties.  I  know,  by  barely  contemplating 
them,  that  these  two  straight  lines  cannot  contain  a 
space.  These  are  called  first  truths.  There  must 
be  first  truths  before  there  can  be  secondary  ones ; 
original  before  there  can  be  derivative  ones.  Can 
we  discover  and  enunciate  these  ?  I  believe  we 
can. 

We  are  not  at  liberty,  indeed,  to  appeal  to  a  first 
principle  when  we  please,  or  because  it  suits  our 
purpose.  When  we  are  left  without  evidence  we 
are  not  therefore  allowed  to  allege  that  we  need  no 
evidence.  When  we  are  defeated  in  argument  we 
are  not  to  be  permitted  to  escape  by  falling  back 
on  what  is  unproved  and  unprovable.  It  is  true 
that  we  cannot  prove  every  thing,  for  this  would 


12         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

imply  an  infinite  chain  of  proofs  every  link  of  which 
would  hang  on  another,  while  the  whole  would 
hang  on  nothing — that  is,  be  incapable  of  proof. 
We  cannot  prove  every  thing  by  mediate  evidence, 
but  we  can  show  that  we  are  justified  in  assuming 
certain  things.  We  cannot  prove  by  any  external 
circumstance  that  two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose 
a  space,  but  we  can  show  that  we  are  justified  in 
assuming  it.  We  are  to  "  prove  all  things."  But 
there  are  some  things  which  have  their  proof  in 
themselves.  We  discover  it  by  simply  looking  at 
the  things.  It  is  thus  that  we  know  that  we  exist ; 
that  the  shortest  distance  between  two  points  is  a 
straight  line ;  that  hypocrisy  is  a  sin.  We  need  no 
external  evidence.  The  evidence  is  in  the  thing;  in 
the  very  nature  of  the  thing.  We  do  not  require 
mediate,  we  have  immediate  proof. 

II. 

This  kind  of  truth  is  to  be  distinguished  from  two 
others  for  which  we  require  what  is  called  mediate 
proof.  First,  there  are  cases  in  which  we  get  this 
by  simply  thinking.  A  truth  being  allowed  we  in- 
fer something  else  from  it.  Thus,  being  assured  that 
all  men  are  responsible,  we  argue  that  heathens, 
being  men,  are  responsible.  Secondly,  in  other 
cases  we  need  observation  and  a  gathering  of  facts, 


Truths  to  be  Assumed.  13 

that  is  induction ;  in  order  to  the  discovery  of  a  gen- 
eral fact  or  law.  It  is  thus  that  we  have  discovered 
that  a  year  consists  of  so  many  days ;  thus  that 
Newton  discovered  the  law  of  gravitation,  and  Dai- 
ton  that  of  definite  proportions  in  the  composition 
of  bodies.  These  two  last  kinds  of  cases,  which 
may  be  called  the  logical  and  inductive,  differ  from 
the  first,  which  may  be  called  the  metaphysical.  In 
this  lecture  first  truths  are  treated  of;  in  those  that 
follow,  reasoned  and  observational  truths.  In  all  the 
three  our  aim  is  to  discover  the  tests. 

III. 

The  evidence  of  the  first  class  of  truths  is  discov- 
ered by  what  is  called  Intuition,  which  looks  directly 
on  the  objects ;  the  truth  is  therefore  called  Intui- 
tive. It  is  also  called  First,  or  Primary,  as  it  is  the 
first  in  the  order  of  nature  and  things.  It  is  desig- 
nated as  Fundamental  in  that  it  bears  up  other 
truths.  It  is  described  as  Necessary  inasmuch  as, 
perceiving  the  objects  directly,  we  cannot  be  made  to 
believe  otherwise.  Since  the  publication  of  Kanfs 
Kritic  of  Pure  Reason  it  is  more  frequently  de- 
scribed as  a  priori  in  that  it  is  known  prior  to  a 
gathered  experience,  the  truth  discovered  by  which 
is  called  a  posteriori.  It  maybe  spoken  of  as  Origi- 
nal, as  opposed  to  what  is  Derived.  These  are  not 


14        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

the  most  prominent  truths  to  the  ordinary  observer ; 
they  lie  deep  down  in  the  soul ;  they  are  the  foun- 
dation on  which  other  truths  are  lajd. 

They  are  numerous  and  varied.  Some  of  them, 
and  these  the  first  and  original  ones,  are  cognition 
of  things.  Thus  we  all  know  body,  with  its  proper- 
ties, and  self  or  spirit,  with  its  properties.  Some  of 
them  are  beliefs — such  as  our  belief  in  space  and 
time  and  in  their  continuity.  From  these  arise 
judgments,  in  which  we  compare  two  or  more  cog- 
nitions and  beliefs  and  discover  a  relation  between 
them.  These  judgments  may  be  arranged  under 
eight  heads.  )  In  identity,  we  declare  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  be  and  not  to  be  at  the  same  time.  3 In 
comprehension,  we  declare  that  the  whole  is  equal 
to  the  sum  of  its  parts.  £  In  resemblance,  we  affirm 
that  what  is  true  of  a  class  must  be  true  of  all  the 
members  of  the  class.  -  We  know  that  body  is  in 
space.  AVe  know  that  all  events  happen  in  time. 
In  quantity  we  are  sure  that  equals  added  to  equals 
are  equals.  *t  In  contemplating  things  as  acting  we 
maintain  that  every  property  implies  a  substance. 
When  we  see  an  effect  we  are  sure  that  it  has  had  a 
cause.  These  are  intellectual  cognitions,  beliefs,  and 
judgments.  But  we  have  also  primary  moral  con- 
victions. We  know  at  once  the  distinction  between 
moral  good  and  evil ;  we  declare  love  to  our  neigh- 


Truths  to  be  Assumed.  15 

bors  to  be  a  virtue  binding  upon  us,  and  we  need 
no  one  to  argue  with  us  to  convince  us  that  to  tell 
a  lie  or  cheat  our  neighbor  is  evil. 

IV. 

These  primitive  convictions  run  through  our 
thoughts,  ideas,  and  acts.  Every  man  acts  upon 
them.  We  are  sure  that  we  exist  and  that  we  have 
a  body,  extended,  and  acting  on  us  and  other  objects. 
We  know  that  we  are  the  same  persons  to-day  that 
we  were  yesterday.  The  creditor,  when  he  receives 
only  part  of  what  is  owing  him,  tells  his  debtor  that 
this  is  less  than  the  whole.  When  a  man  knows 
that  spring,  summer,  autumn,  and  winter  make  up 
the  seasons  he  expects  when  the  three  first  are  past 
that  winter  is  coming.  A  farmer  does  not  propose 
to  inclose  a  field  by  two  straight  fences.  When 
we  awake  from  sleep  we  are  confident  that  we  have 
been  alive  all  the  time  since  we  fell  asleep.  The 
clerk  in  his  calculations  acts  on  the  principle  that 
equals  subtracted  from  equals  are  equals.  When 
we  see  a  body  we  are  convinced  that  it  has 
properties.  When  we  see  a  house  on  fire  we  are 
sure  it  has  been  ignited.  The  circumstance  that  all 
men  act  upon  these  principles  led  the  Scottish 
school  of  metaphysicians  to  call  them  principles  of 
common  sense. 


16        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

V. 

We  may  assume  all  such  truths.  They  do  not 
need  proof.  A  man  who  would  seek  it  must  be  be- 
side himself.  He  may  be  compared  to  one  going 
out  with  a  taper  to  see  the  sun.  These  truths  shine 
in  their  own  light*  We  may  use  them  in  all  our 
thoughts  and  inquiries  and  in  all  our  arguments 
with  our  fellow-men,  provided  we  properly  enun- 
ciate them. 

A  man  had  better  assume  his  own  existence.  He 
might  find  it  difficult  to  establish  it  by  argument. 
But  if  he  is  determined,  by  all  means  let  him  try  it; 
he  will  only  be  impressed  the  more  with  the  impos- 
sibility of  his  doing  it.  How  will  he  do  it?  To 
what  will  he  appeal  ?  How  will  he  begin  ?  With 
the  testimony  of  his  neighbors  ?  He  will  find  that 
he  has  clearer  proof  of  his  own  existence  than  of 
that  of  his  neighbor,  and  that  he  cannot  prove  the 
existence  of  his  neighbors  till  he  first  proves  his 
own.  It  is  the  same  with  all  other  self-evident 
truths.  We  cannot  prove  them  by  other  truths,  but 
we  may  use  them  to  prove  other  truths. 

VI. 

Let  us  seek  to  determine  precisely  the  nature  of 
these  truths.  They  may  be  viewed  under  three 
aspects — aspects  of  one  and  the  same  thing. 


Truths  to  be  Assumed.  17 

1.  They  are  Perceptions  of  Things.     We  perceive 
that  body  is  extended,  and  that  it  exercises  proper- 
ties, such  as  resistance  to  our  energy  and  to   other 
bodies.     We  are  conscious  of  self  as  thinking  and 
feeling.     We  believe  that  space  and  time    extend 
beyond  what  we   observe  of  them.     We  decide  at 
once  that  contradictions  cannot  both  be  true  ;  that 
the  abstract   implies  the  concrete;  that  universals 
imply  singulars ;  that  we  cannot  be  both  here  and 
in  China  at  the  same  time  ;  that  two  halves  make  up 
the  whole  ;  that  properties  imply  a  substance  ;  that 
a  change  is  produced  by  an  adequate  power.     We 
look  on  self-sacrifice,  for  a  good  cause,  as  good,  and 
treachery  as  an  evil.     All  these  perceptions  are  di- 
rect, and  are  in  consciousness. 

2.  They  are  Regulative  Principles.     \  do  not  be- 
lieve that  there  is  any  such  thing   as  innate  ideas.- 
Uocke    exploded    them  forever.     But  the  mind  of 
the  child  is  not  altogether  a  nonentity  or  a  blank. 
It  has   powers  or  capacities  ready  to  be  exercised 
on  the  appropriate  objects  being  presented.     These 
are  in  the  mind  as  gravitation  lies  in  matter,  as  life 
remains  in  the   seed  all  winter,  as  seeds   have  re- 
mained, with  life  in  them,  in  the  tombs  of  Egypt  for 
thousands  of  years. 

Mr.  Mill  has  shown  that  all  the  powers  in  nature 

are   tendencies.     They   tend    to    act   according   to 
2 


18        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

their  nature.  Thus  oxygen  tends  to  join  in  definite 
proportions  with  hydrogen  to  form  water ;  bodies 
attract  other  bodies  to  them  inversely  according  to 
the  square  of  the  distance.  Our  ideas  tend,  unless 
interfered  with  by  external  objects,  to  follow  each 
other  in  a  certain  order ;  when  two  ideas  have  been 
in  the  mind  together,  the  one  tends  to  cull  the 
other,  and  like  suggests  like.  In  much  the  same 
way  the  powers  of  intuition  abiding  in  the  mind 
ever  tend  to  act,  and  are  called  forth  by  objects.  In 
a  sense,  they  so  far  direct  and  control  the  mind.  Of 
the  principle  we  are  not  conscious,  but  we  are  con- 
scious of  its  exercises,  which  are  the  perceptions  of 
which  I  have  been  speaking  under  last  head. 

3.  They  may  become  Axioms.  All  the  percep- 
tions of  which  I  have  been  discoursing  are  in  the 
first  instance  singular  or  individual,  and  not  abstract 
or  general.  We  do  not  say  of  every  two  straight 
lines  that  they  cannot  inclose  space,  but  of  these 
two  straight  lines  before  us  that  they  cannot  in- 
close a  space.  We  do  not  at  first  announce  that  all 
men  are  responsible,  but  of  ourselves  or  some  other 
person  that  he  is  responsible.  I  do  not  formally 
proclaim  the  metaphysical  principle,  every  effect  has 
a  cause,  but  of  this  particular  effect,  the  burning  of  a 
rick  of  hay,  that  it  has  had  a  cause.  But  then  we 
can  generalize  our  individual  perceptions.  We  see 


Truths  to  be  Assumed.  19 

that  what  is  true  of  the  object  or  case  before  us  is 
true  of  the  same  object  or  cases  every-where  and 
in  all  places.  We  now  reach  general  maxims  true 
of  the  objects  at  all  times  and  in  all  circumstances. 
Fraud  cannot  be  good  on  the  planet  Earth,  or  the 
planet  Jupiter,  or  the  dog-star  Sirius.  Parallel 
lines,  we  see,  will  never  meet  in  earth,  or  star,  or 
the  space  beyond.  We  have  now  such  axioms  as 
those  of  Euclid.  We  have  moral  maxims  such  as 
the  Ten  Commandments,  and  the  precepts  in  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount. 

VII. 

But  what  we  have  specially  to  do  here  is  to 
enumerate  the  criteria  by  which  such  truths  may 
be  tried,  and  which  will  settle  for  us  whether  we  are 
entitled  to  assume  without  any  mediate  proof 
what  may  be  presented  to  us  by  ourselves  or  others 
for  our  acceptance. 

SELF-EVIDENCE  is  the  primary  test  of  that  kind 
of  truth  which  we  are  entitled  to  assume  without 
mediate  proof.  We  perceive  the  object  to  exist  by 
simply  looking  at  it.  The  truth  shines  in  its  own 
light,  and,  in  order  to  see,  we  do  not  require  light  to 
shine  upon  it  from  any  other  quarter.  We  are 
conscious,  directly,  of  self  as  understanding,  as  think- 
ing, or  as  feeling,  and  we  need  no  indirect  evidence. 


20        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

Thus,  too,  we  perceive  by  the  eye  a  colored  surface, 
and  by  the  muscular  touch  a  resisting  object,  and 
by  the  moral  sense  the  evil  of  hypocrisy.  The 
proof  is  seen  by  the  contemplative  mind  in  the 
things  themselves.  We  are  convinced  that  we  need 
no  other  proof.  A  proffered  probation  from  any 
other  quarter  would  not  add  to  the  strength  of  our 
conviction.  We  do  not  seek  any  external  proof, 
and  if  any  were  pressed  upon  us  we  would  feel  it  to 
be  unnecessary — nay,  to  be  an  encumbrance,  and 
almost  an  insult  to  our  understanding. 

But  let  us  properly  understand  the  nature  of  this 
self-evidence.  It  has  constantly  been  misunder- 
stood and  misrepresented.  It  is  not  a  mere  feel- 
ing or  an  emotion  belonging  to  the  sensitive  part 
of  our  nature.  It  is  not  blind  instinct,  or  a  belief 
in  what  we  cannot  see.  It  is  not  above  reason  or 
below  reason  ;  it  is  an  exercise  of  primary  reason 
prior,  in  the  nature  of  things,  to  any  derivative  ex- 
ercises. It  is  not,  as  Kant  represents  it,  of  the 
nature  of  a  form  in  the  mind  imposed  on  objects 
contemplated  and  giving  them  a  shape  and  color. 
It  is  a  perception,  it  is  an  intuition  of  the  object. 
We  inspect  these  two  straight  lines,  and  perceive 
them  to  be  such  in  their  nature  that  they  cannot 
inclose  a  space.  If  two  straight  lines  go  on  for  an 
inch  without  coming  nearer  each  other,  we  are  sure 


Truths  to  be  Assumed.  21 

they  will  be  no  nearer  if  lengthened  millions  of 
miles  as  straight  lines.  On  contemplating  deceit 
we  perceive  the  act  to  be  wrong  in  its  very  nature. 
It  is  not  a  mere  sentiment  such  as  we  feel  on  the 
contemplation  of  pleasure  and  pain  ;  it  is  a  knowl- 
edge of  an  object.  It  is  not  the  mind  imposing  or 
superinducing  on  the  thing  what  is  not  in  the  thing ; 
it  is  simply  the  mind  perceiving  what  is  in  the 
thing.  It  is  not  merely  subjective,  it  is  also  object- 
ive— to  use  phrases  very  liable  to  be  misunder- 
stood ;  or,  to  speak  clearly,  the  perceiving  mind 
(subject)  perceives  the  thing  (object).  This  is  the 
most  satisfactory  of  all  evidence ;  and  this  because 
in  it  we  are  immediately  cognizant  of  the  thing. 
There  is  no  evidence  so  ready  to  carry  conviction. 
We  cannot  so  much  as  conceive  or  imagine  any 
evidence  stronger. 

NECESSITY  is  a  secondary  criterion.  It  has  been 
represented  by  Leibnitz  and  many  metaphysicians 
as  the  first  and  the  essential  test.  This  I  regard  as 
a  mistake.  Self-evidence  comes  first,  and  the  other 
follows  and  is  derived  from  it.  We  perceive  an  ob- 
ject before  us  and  know  so  much  of  its  nature ;  and 
we  cannot  be  made  to  believe  that  there  is  no 
such  object,  or  that  it  is  not  what  we  know  it  to  be. 
I  demur  to  the  idea  so  often  pressed  upon  us  that 
we  are  to  believe  a  certain  proposition  because  we 


22         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

are  necessitated  to  believe  in  it.  This  sounds  too 
much  like  fatality  to  be  agreeable  to  the  free  spirit 
of  man.  It  is  because  we  are  conscious  of  self 
that  we  cannot  be  made  to  believe  that  we  do  not 
exist.  The  account  given  of  the  principle  by  Her- 
bert Spencer  is  a  perverted  and  a  vague  one :  all 
propositions  are  to  be  accepted  as  unquestionable 
whose  negative  is  inconceivable.  This  does  not 
give  us  a  direct  criterion  as  self-evidence  does,  and 
the  word  inconceivable  is  very  ambiguous.  But 
necessity,  while  it  is  not  the  primary  is  a  potent 
secondary  test.  The  self-evidence  convinces  us ; 
the  necessity  prevents  us  from  holding  any  different 
conviction. 

CATHOLICITY  or  Universality  is  the  tertiary  test. 
By  this  is  meant  that  it  is  believed  by  all  men.  It 
is  the  argument  from  catholicity,  or  common  con- 
sent— the  sensus  communis.  All  men  are  found  to 
assent  to  the  particular  truth  when  it  is  fairly  laid 
before  them,  as,  for  instance,  that  the  shortest  dis- 
tance between  two  points  is  a  straight  line.  It 
would  not  be  wise  nor  safe  to  make  this  the  primary 
test,  as  some  of  the  ancients  did.  For,  in  the  com- 
plexity of  thought,  in  the  constant  actual  mixing 
up  of  experiential  with  immediate  evidence,  it  is 
difficult  to  determine  what  all  men  believe.  It  is 
even  conceivable  that  all  men  might  be  deceived 


Truths  to  be  Assumed.  23 

by  reason  of  the  deceitfulness  of  the  faculties  and 
the  illusive  nature  of  things.  But  this  tertiary 
comes  in  to  corroborate  the  primary  test,  or  rather 
to  show  that  the  proposition  can  stand  the  primary 
test  which  proceeds  on  the  observation  of  the  very 
thing,  in  which  it  is  satisfactory  to  find  that  all 
men  are  agreed. 

Combine  these  and  we  have  a  perfect  means  of 
determining  what  are  first  truths.  The  first  gives 
us  a  personal  assurance  of  which  we  can  never  be 
deprived ;  the  second  secures  that  we  cannot  con- 
quer it ;  the  third,  that  we  can  appeal  to  all  men  as 
having  the  same  conviction.  The  first  makes  known 
realities ;  the  second  restrains  us  from  breaking  off 
from  them  ;  the  third  shows  us  that  we  are  sur- 
rounded with  a  community  of  beings  to  whom  we 
can  address  ourselves  in  the  assurance  of  meeting 
with  a  response.  The  first  is  the  most  satisfactory, 
as  it  brings  us  closest  to  things.  The  second  is  the 
most  definite  and  decisive,  as  it  admits  of  no  denial. 
The  third  brings  us  into  closest  relationship  with  our 
fellow  men  and  gives  us  confidence  in  addressing 
them.  The  three  constitute  a  treble  cord  which 
cannot  be  broken. 

It  should  be  noticed  that  these  tests  apply  not  only 
to  our  primitive  knowledge  but  to  our  primitive 
beliefs.  We  have  such  beliefs.  We  believe  in  the 


24        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

existence  of  things  which  we  cannot  know  by  the 
senses,  which  we  cannot  see  or  hear,  smell  or  taste 
or  touch.  We  believe  in  space  and  time  as  stretching 
away  beyond  our  ken.  We  believe  in  the  infinite, 
though  we  may  not  be  able  fully  to  comprehend  it. 
Our  beliefs  require  to  be  tested  fully  and  as  much  as 
our  knowledge.  A  large  number  of  men  and  women, 
even  some  who  are  shrewd  and  wise,  are  apt  to 
cherish  fancies  which  have  no  realities  correspond- 
ing to  them.  There  are  classes  of  people  who  are 
particularly  addicted  to  such  visions.  You  hear 
them  say,  "  I  feel  this  to  be  true.  I  must  believe 
it."  A  more  cultivated  set  of  people  tell  you  this  is 
so  interesting  that  I  must  cleave  to  it.  There  are 
numbers  thus  led  into  great  extravagances  of  cre- 
dence which  expose  them  to  ridicule  or  land  them 
in  folly,  or,  it  may  be,  in  very  serious  errors  or 
mistakes. 

Now  there  is  a  method  of  keeping  people  from 
being  allured  into  bogs  by  these  will-o'- wisps.  We 
are  to  try  the  spirits  whether  they  are  of  God.  We 
have  a  reliable  means  of  trying  them.  We  may, 
we  should,  inquire  whether  what  we  are  invited  to 
assume  is  self-evident  truth  and  not  a  mere  fancy ; 
whether  we  are  necessitated  to  believe  it  as  we  look 
at  the  things,  or  whether  we  may  not  be  led  to 
adopt  or  reject  it  by  the  wishes  of  the  heart ; 


Truths  to  be  Assumed.  25 

whether  it  is  held  by  man  as  man,  or  merely  by 
people  with  idiosyncrasies  and  prejudices.  Our 
feelings  were  never  meant  to  be  the  tests  of  truth, 
though  they  may  prompt  us  to  seek  it,  may  irradi- 
ate it  so  as  to  make  it  more  attractive,  and  instil 
life  into  the  soul  and  thereby  prompt  to  action. 

It  is  to  be  admitted  that  there  is  a  mysticism 
which  is  very  fascinating  and  at  times  elevating,  as, 
for  instance,  in  the  pages  of  Thomas  a  Kempis.  But 
it  may  be  delusive,  and  the  error  may  be  accepted 
along  with  the  truth.  We  may,  by  the  criteria  I 
have  announced,  get  all  the  good  without  the  ac- 
companying evil ;  we  may  root  out  the  weeds,  that 
the  flower  and  fruit-bearing  plants  may  flourish  the 
better.  The  tests  clear  away  the  mists  that  we  may 
have  a  full  view  of  the  beauties  of  the  sky  and 
landscape. 

It  will  be  understood  that  what  is  offered  in  this 
lecture  does  not  profess  to  be  the  whole  of  knowl- 
edge ;  it  is  only  primary  knowledge.  A  far  greater 
number  and  variety  of  truths  are  reached  in  other 
ways  than  by  intuition,  while,  however,  they  always 
presuppose  it.  Yet  only  the  foundation-stones  have 
been  laid — I  hope,  as  the  Free  Masons  say,  that 
"  this  foundation  is  well  laid,"  that  it  is  "  a  sure 
foundation."  The  mature  tree  is  not  yet  before 
us ;  only  a  few  seeds  have  been  sown  and  some 


26        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

roots  planted,  which  are  well  "rooted  and  grounded." 
These  primitive  truths,  like  the  granite  rocks,  go 
down  deepest  into  the  earth  and  mount  the  highest 
toward  heaven.  They  bind  and  guarantee  all  other 
truths.  They  give  us  what  no  other  powers  can, 
which  sense  cannot  give  nor  understanding  give — 
eternal  truths  and  eternal  morality.  They  look  as 
if  they  were  the  very  footstool  of  God,  before  which 
we  bow  and  put  up  our  petitions  for  further  instruc- 
tion to  him  who  sitteth  upon  the  throne. 


Discursive  or  Deductive  Truth.  27 


LECTURE  SECOND. 
DISCURSIVE  OR  DEDUCTIVE  TRUTH. 

I. 

WE  have  seen  what  are  the  truths  with  which 
every  mind  starts.  We  are  now  to  view  it 
as  adding  to  the  stock.  It  may  do  so  in  two  ways. 
It  may  by  its  own  power,  or  by  a  gathered  observa- 
tion of  facts.  In  this  lecture  I  am  to  treat  of  the 
first  of  these  methods. 

The  process  by  which  this  end  is  accomplished  is 
discursive  or  deductive  ;  that  is,  we  proceed  from 
a  truth  given  or  allowed  to  something  else  implied 
in  or  deduced  from  it.  It  being  granted  that  all 
men  are  mortal,  we  at  once  conclude  that  this  man 
and  that  man  and  that  we  ourselves  must  die. 

What  is  admitted  is  called  the  premise  or  prem- 
ises. These  may  be  got  from  one  or  other  of 
two  quarters  :  from  intuition — that  is,  immediate 
inspection  of  things — or  from  induction,  that  is, 
from  a  gathered  collection  of  facts.  The  first  of 
these  has  been  expounded  in  last  lecture,  the  other 
will  be  unfolded  in  the  lectures  which  follow. 

We   pre-suppose,   then,  that   the   mind  has  got 


28        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

certain  facts  allowed  it  as  premises.  These  may  be 
intuitive  or  inductive ;  one  or  both.  In  looking  at 
these  we  discover  that  certain  truths  are  involved 
in  them  and  may  be  legitimately  drawn  from  them. 
In  this  lecture  I  am  to  unfold  the  process  by  which 
this  end  is  accomplished,  to  determine  the  laws, 
their  extent,  and  their  limits. 

The  discursive  process  is  usually  described  as  con- 
sisting of  three  elements — the  Notion,  Judgment, 
and  Reasoning.  There  is  the  notion,  which,  when 
expressed  in  language,  is  the  term.  There  is  judg- 
ment, which,  when  expressed,  is  the  proposition. 
There  is  reasoning,  which,  when  put  in  words,  is 
the  argument.  By  means  of  each  of  these  we  reach 
derivative  truth,  which  may  be  rigidly  tested. 

Logic  is  the  science  which  treats  of  discursive 
thought.  I  am  not,  in  this  little  work,  to  give  a 
system  of  logic.  I  use  logic  simply  as  furnishing 
the  criteria  by  which  deductive  truth  may  be  tried. 

The  grand  regulating  principle  of  all  discursive 
thought  is  that  what  is  drawn  from  the  premise  or 
premises  must  be  in  the  premises.  Being  there,  and 
being  seen  to  be  there,  we  draw  it  out.  But  we 
must  take  care  that  what  we  bring  out  is  in  what 
we  have  derived  it  from.  This  law,  rigidly  carried 
out,  will  preserve  us  from  all  inconclusive  reason- 
ing. We  cannot  draw  light  from  cucumbers,  be- 


Discursive  or  Deductive  Truth.  29 

cause  there  is  no  light  in  the  cucumber.  But,  it 
being  allowed  us  that  all  men  have  a  conscience, 
we  infer  that  this  liar,  though  he  has  not  obeyed  it, 
has  a  conscience.  This  general  rule  may  be  applied 
to  every  kind  of  deduction  or  discursive  thought, 
and,  taken  along  with  other  and  more  minute 
rules  founded  on  it,  decides  for  us  whether  we  are 
proceeding  on  the  laws  of  thought,  which,  being 
planted  or  developed  in  our  nature  by  God,  are 
always  truthful  and  authoritative.  Each  of  the 
two  great  processes  will  be  found  to  have  its  own 
laws. 

II. 

THE  NOTION  OR  TERM.  First  under  this  head  is 
the  Singular  notion,  such  as  the  earth,  the  heavens, 
Homer,  Shakespeare,  George  Washington,  "  sky, 
mountains,  rivers,  winds,  lake,  lightnings,  yea,  with 
clouds  and  thunders,  and  a  soul  to  make  them  felt 
and  feeling."  The  singulars  are  always  concrete; 
that  is,  they  contain  an  aggregate  of  qualities  which 
we  call  attributes ;  thus,  the  earth  has  elementary 
bodies  and  is  attracted  to  the  sun.  I  call  such 
notions  Singular  Concretes.  Secondly,  there  is  the 
Abstract  notion ;  that  is,  notion  of  part  of  a  whole, 
more  specially  of  an  attribute  of  an  object.  As  ex- 
amples I  may  give,  leg  of  table  ;  foot  of  a  man  ;  foot 
of  a  mountain ;  gravity,  beauty,  honesty,  human- 


30         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

ity.  Thirdly,  there  is  the  General  notion,  the  uni- 
versal of  the  schoolmen,  the  concept  of  the  German, 
such  as  stones,  plants,  animals,  man,  woman,  angels. 
All  these  contain  an  indefinite  number  of  objects ; 
namely,  all  that  possess  the  common  qualities  of 
the  class. 

Now  we  may  derive  truths  from  each  of  these 
classes.  Thus  from  singular  concrete  truths  we 
can  draw  abstracts;  from  this  body  before  us  we 
can  get  the  abstraction  gravity;  from  this  man, 
manliness ;  from  this  woman,  beauty ;  from  Wash- 
ington, patriotism.  Again,  from  singulars  we  can 
form  generals ;  by  help  of  abstraction  all  can  unite 
things  by  common  attributes  in  them,  and  form  the 
class,  rose,  lily,  dog,  horse,  man,  American. 

Now  it  is  of  the  utmost  moment  that  we  know 
the  nature  of  the  notions  and  terms  we  employ.  In 
thinking,  in  reading,  in  speaking  we  should  know 
what  sorts  of  terms  are  used ;  whether  they  are 
singular  or  common,  concrete  or  abstract.  In  em- 
ploying concretes  we  should  ascertain,  more  or  less 
definitely,  the  properties  possessed  by  them.  It  is 
a  great  mistake  to  look  upon  an  attribute  as  having 
an  independent  existence ;  gravity,  for  instance,  has 
an  existence  only  in  the  bodies  of  which  it  is  a 
quality.  In  thinking,  in  speaking  of  universal  or 
classes  we  should  have  an  idea,  the  clearer  the 


Discursive  or 

better,  of  the  qualities  which  combine  the  ob- 
jects. 

Of  all  fallacies  that  of  confusion  is  the  most  com- 
mon and  the  most  misleading,  and  of  all  fallacies 
of  confusion  that  of  notions  or  terms  is  the  most 
injurious,  being  more  so  than  those  of  judgment 
or  reasoning.  When  an  object  or  a  cause  is  placed 
fairly  before  us  we  can  commonly  judge  of  it  and 
reason  about  it  correctly.  But  when  it  is  put  in 
imperfectly  understood  terms  our  thinking  is  apt 
to  be  perplexed  and  mistaken.  I  believe  that  more 
than  one  half  of  the  errors  of  thinking  arise  from 
confusion  in  our  Notions.  The  prejudices  of  the 
heart  work  on  these,  "  the  wish  is  father  of  the 
thought/'  and  the  issue  is  misapprehension  and 
error,  and,  it  may  be,  sin. 

There  has  been  an  immense  amount  of  contro- 
versy about  abstract  and  general  terms.  It  was  the 
grand  topic  of  discussion  among  the  scholastics  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  and  I  am  convinced  that  it  is  of 
vast  moment  to  clear  up  the  subject.  It  is  still  in 
a  confused  state.  I  feel  no  difficulty  in  comprehend- 
ing the  nature  of  the  abstract  and  general  notion. 
The  question  is,  What  reality  is  there  in  these  no- 
tions ?  I  think  it  can  be  answered  clearly  and  sat- 
isfactorily. The  abstract  has  no  independent  reality 
— its  reality  is  in  the  things  from  which  it  is  ab- 


32         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truths. 

stracted  ;  thus  honesty  has  a  reality  in  the  honest 
man.  The  universal  or  class  notion  has  a  reality  in 
the  objects  embraced  in  it  and  in  the  qualities  com- 
bining them.  The  common  notion,  "  vertebrate 
animal,"  has  a  reality  in  the  animals  and  in  the  ver- 
tebrate column  which  they  all  possess. 

III. 

JUDGMENT;  which,  when  expressed  in  language, 
is  the  Proposition.  In  this  we  compare  two  no- 
tions ;  or,  rather,  the  two  things  embraced  in  the 
notions  declaring  their  agreement  or  disagreement. 
In  making  the  comparison  we  have  to  look  to  the 
nature  of  the  notions  and  observe  what  is  embraced 
in  them.  The  comparison  we  make  may  be  viewed 
under  two  aspects.  "  The  bird  sings."  Here  we 
have  two  terms.  "  The  bird  "  and  "  sings,"  or,  "  is 
singing."  The  one  of  these  is  singular — "  the  bird  ;  " 
the  other  is  common — "  is  singing."  In  compre- 
hension, that  is,  in  regard  to  the  qualities  pos- 
sessed by  it,  it  means  that  it  has  "  the  attribute  of 
singing;"  in  extension,  that  is,  in  regard  to  the 
objects  in  its  class,  it  declares  that  the  bird  is 
"  among  singing,  creatures."  These  two  are  in- 
volved in  each  other ;  the  one  implies  the  other. 

In  forming  these  judgments  we  should  attend 
carefully  to  the  nature  of  the  two  things  compared, 


Discursive  or  Deductive   Truth.  33 

and,  as  we  do  so,  we  may  draw  a  number  of  infer- 
ences. These  have  a  place,  and  an  important  place, 
allotted  to  them  in  all  advanced  works  on  logic. 
They  are  called  Immediate  Inferences.  I  call  them 
Implied  Judgments.  Thus  by  subalternation,  that 
is,  of  things  under  classes,  we  infer  that  if  all  men 
be  responsible  the  heathen  are  responsible.  Under 
extension  we  say  what  is  true  of  a  class  is  true 
of  each  member  of  the  class  ;  for  example,  what  is 
true  of  all  roses  is  true  of  the  rose  before  us.  Under 
conversion  we  turn  the  subject  into  the  predicate, 
and  the  predicate  into  the  subject ;  thus,  it  being 
given  that  all  poets  are  men  of  genius,  it  follows 
that  some  men  of  genius — not  necessarily  all  men 
of  genius — are  poets.  When  we  have  contradictory 
propositions  we  are  sure  that  when  the  one  is  true 
the  other  must  be  false. 

The  following  inferences  have  been  drawn  in 
Thomson's  Outlines  of  tlie  Laivs  of  Thought  from 
the  proposition  men  are  responsible : 

IN  EXTENSION. 

Every  man  is  in  the  class  responsible. 
This  man  is  responsible. 
Some  men  are  responsible. 
Some  responsible  beings  are  men. 
It  is  not  true  that  no  men  are  responsible. 
It  is  not  true  that  some  men  are  not  responsible,  etc. 
3 


34         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truths. 

IN  COMPREHENSION. 
Man  exists. 

Responsibility  is  a  real  attribute. 
Responsibility  is  an  attribute  of  every  man. 
Responsibility  is  an  attribute  of  this  man. 
Responsibility  is  an  attribute  of  every  tribe  of  men. 
Responsibility  is  an  attribute  of  some  men. 
Irresponsibility  may  be  denied  of  all  men. 
No  man  is  irresponsible. 
Irresponsible  beings  are  not  men. 
Men  of  wealth  are  responsible  with  their  wealth. 
To  punish  men  is  to  punish  responsible  men,  etc. 

IV. 

REASONING.  This  is  the  highest  form  of  the 
discursive  processes.  Every  human  being  is  em- 
ploying it.  The  infant,  the  child,  is  using  it  per- 
petually in  drawing  conclusions  from  what  he  ob- 
serves ;  in  determining,  for  instance,  the  distances  of 
objects,  which  it  has  been  shown  he  does  not  know 
instinctively.  The  very  fool  uses  it,  only,  however, 
about  insignificant  objects,  say,  his  animal  wants, 
as  when  he  argues  that  food  will  satisfy  his  hunger. 
The  madman,  commonly  starting  from  mistaken 
premises,  from  a  wrong  idea  and  belief  impressed 
upon  his  mind,  often  bursts  forth  into  wonderful 
displays  of  it.  The  intellectual  ability  of  a  man 
(I  do  not  say  his  genius)  is  shown  in  the  extent  and 
agility  with  which  he  reasons.  There  is  reasoning, 


Discursive  or  Deductive   Truth.  35 

in  a  lower  or  higher  shape,  in  the  every-day  trans- 
actions of  life,  as  when  we  avoid  danger  and  seek 
to  secure  what  will  gratify  us.  It  has  a  neces- 
sary place  in  all  the  sciences  which  combine  in  a 
system  the  objects  which  present  themselves  to 
us.  Mathematics,  beginning  with  definitions  and 
axioms  which  are  self-evident,  consists  in  reason- 
ing throughout,  and  this  often  of  a  very  deli- 
cate and  recondite  nature,  as  in  quaternions  and 
functions. 

Now  it  is  surely  of  vast  moment,  since  so  much 
of  mental  activity  is  thus  exercised,  that  we  should 
have  decisive  tests  to  determine  when  we  are  reason- 
ing correctly.  Now  we  have  had  this  ever  since  the 
days  of  Aristotle,  who  analyzed  the  reasoning  pro- 
cesses for  us  in  the  fourth  century  before  Christ. 
Attempts  have  been  made  once  and  again  to  set 
aside  his  account,  but  all  of  these,  after  a  brief  ap- 
parent success,  are  admitted  to  have  been  failures. 
This  analytic  sets  before  us  all  the  forms  which 
reasoning  takes,  and  thus  enables  us  to  try  every 
sort  of  pretended  argument. 

The  whole  of  reasoning  is  founded  on  one  simple 
law  called  the  Dictum  of  Aristotle,  which  takes  two 
forms.  Put  in  the  form  of  extension,  that  is,  of  the 
objects  which  the  terms  contain,  it  is,  "Whatever 
is  true  of  a  class  is  true  of  all  the  members  of  a 


36         The  Tes.ts  of  The  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

class."  It  may  also  take  the  form  of  comprehen- 
sion, that  is,  of  the  attributes  of  the  class.  "  A 
part  of  a  part  of  an  attribute  will  be  part  of  the 
whole  attribute."  Reasoning,  when  spread  out, 
takes  the  form  of  a  syllogism,  in  which  we  have 
two  premises  and  a  conclusion.  First,  we  have  two 
notions  given  us  in  the  premises,  and  we  cannot, 
on  looking  on  them,  say  whether  they  do  or  do  not 
agree.  We  are  not  told  in  Scripture  whether  John 
the  Baptist  was  a  priest,  but  we  call  in  a  third  term, 
son,  of  a  priest,  and  we  compare  each  of  the  other 
two  with  this  third  term.  We  know  that  the  sons 
of  priests  were  also  priests,  and  we  have  the  syl- 
logism : 

The  sons  of  priests  were  priests  ; 
The  Baptist  was  the  son  of  a  priest ; 
Therefore  he  was  a  priest. 

This  type  determines  for  us  whether  reasoning  is 
valid.  If  it  cannot  be  put  in  this  form  it  is  invalid. 

This  is  the  Categorical  form.  But,  being  guided 
by  the  same  dictum,  it  may  take  a  Hypothetical 
shape : 

If  this  man  has  consumption 

He  will  soon  die. 
He  has  consumption. 

He  will  soon  die. 


Discursive  or  Deductive  Truth.  37 

Or  some  cases  may  be  put  conveniently  in  the 
form  of  a  Disjunctive  : 

Lines  are  either  straight  or  curved. 
The  line  A  B  is  not  straight ; 
It  must  be  curved. 

Or  it  may  be  best  exhibited  in  the  form  of  a 
dilemma : 

If  a  man  can  help  a  thing  he  should  not  fret  about  it. 
If  he  cannot  help  a  thing  he  should  not  fret  about  it. 
But  he  can  either  help  a  thing  or  not  help  it. 
In  either  case  he  should  not  fret  about  it. 

In  some  cases  we  have  a  seriate  or  chained  rea- 
soning by  a  series  of  arguments. 

I  simply  refer  to  these  forms.  I  am  not  to 
spread  out  their  details.  This  is  done  with  care 
and  accuracy  in  every  Logical  treatise  of  any  value. 
They  can  all  be  reduced  to  the  form  of  the  syllo- 
gism which  depends  on  the  Dictum.  These  Logical 
forms  supply  us  with  tests  clear  and  certain  for 
every  kind  of  reasoning,  in  science  or  in  the  busi- 
ness of  life. 

Logic  has  at  times  been  exposed  to  ridicule  be- 
cause of  its  multiplied  technical  rules,  which,  it  is 
alleged,  rather  perplex  and  confuse  the  mind,  and 
lead  it  into  sophistry.  Thus  the  great  English 
satirist  describes  Hudibras  : 


38         The  Tests  of  The  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

He  was  in  logic  a  great  critic, 

Profoundedly  skilled  in  analytic  ; 

He  could  distinguish  and  divide 

A  hair  twixt  south  and  south-west  side; 

On  either  which  he  would  dispute, 

Confute,  change  hands,  and  still  confute. 

The  pilot  of  a  ship  often  needs  to  decide  between 
narrower  distinctions  than  that  between  west  and 
north-west  side,  and  if  he  neglects  to  do  so  his  ves- 
sel may  be  wrecked.  So  every  man,  in  his  voyage 
through  the  troubled  ocean  of  life,  needs  to  make 
more  delicate  distinctions  than  the  pilot  or  the 
geographer.  Error  will  present  itself  in  forms  so 
like  the  truth  that  it  is  very  apt  to  deceive  us,  and 
so  we  need  rules  which  will  accept  the  true  and  re- 
ject the  false.  This  is  the  use  of  all  those  formulae 
which  Logic  has  drawn  out  with  such  care.  It  is 
intended,  not  to  produce  and  foster  wrangling,  but 
to  discourage  and  arrest  it,  and  to  show  us  the  way 
by  which  certainty  may  be  reached. 

V. 

We  have  now  before  us  the  operations  of  discur- 
sive thought,  embracing  the  Notion,  Judgment,  and 
Reasoning.  The  scientific  expression  of  these  con- 
stitutes Logic.  The  science  can  determine  for  us 
whether  the  deductions  drawn  out  by  ourselves  or 


Discursive  or  Deductive   Truth.  39 

others  are  valid.  Let  us  look  for  a  little  at  the 
way  in  which  Logic  accomplishes  this  end  by  the 
laws  which  it  lays  down. 

The  formation  of  notions  is  governed  by  laws. 
These  can  be  ascertained  and  enunciated.  Deduc- 
tions can  be  drawn  from  them. 

From  the  singular  concrete  notions  we  can  draw 
others.  From  an  apple  before  us  we  can  get  the 
notion  of  its  taste,  its  color,  its  weight,  its  odor. 
These  are  abstract  notions.  Again,  from  a  number 
of  apples  we  can  collect  them  into  a  class  and  affirm 
of  this  object  before  us  that  it  is  an  apple.  Let  us 
understand  correctly  what  is  the  nature  of  these 
two  notions,  the  abstract  and  the  concrete.  Take 
gravitation — some  scientific  men  all  but  worship  it." 
Let  me  tell  them  that  gravitation  has  no  existence 
save  in  the  bodies  which  it  draws  toward  each 
other.  Newton,  when  he  discovered  the  law,  looked 
to  the  bodies  in  which  it  acts:  to  the  apple  falling 
to  the  ground,  to  the  moon  drawn  toward  the 
earth.  So  much  for  an  abstraction  ;  it  exists  as  an 
attribute  in  the  objects  from  which  it  is  taken. 

There  is  a  class  notion  ;  there  is  not  only  this 
apple  which  we  know  by  the  senses,  but  there  is 
the  class  apple;  embracing  all  the  apples  which 
have  ever  existed,  all  the  apples  which  ever  shali 
exist,  nay,  all  the  apples  which  children  have 


40         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truths. 

longed  for  in  their  fancies,  all  the  apples  which 
poets  or  painters  have  drawn.  The  class  has  an 
existence,  but  not  an  independent  one ;  it  has  an 
existence  simply  in  the  objects  and  in  the  qualities 
which  combine  them. 

Now  certain  rules  can  be  laid  down  as  to  these 
abstract  and  general  notions.  I.  The  abstract  im- 
plies the  concrete  in  which  it  exists.  II.  The  gen- 
eral implies  particular  things  of  which,  under  the 
bond  which  connects  them,  it  exists.  It  is  asked, 
what  sort  of  existence  have  abstract  and  general 
notions?  You  hear  people  say  of  certain  notions 
that  they  are  nonentities ;  they  are  mere  abstrac- 
tions. But  all  abstractions  are  not  nonentities; 
The  love  of  a  mother  is  not  a  nonentity — it  ex- 
ists in  the  mother.  Virtue,  though  an  abstract 
term,  is  not  a  fiction,  it  exists  in  all  virtuous  men 
and  women.  You  tell  me  that  you  know  by  the 
senses  what  an  apple  is,  but  as  to  the  class  apple 
it  is  a  fiction.  I  ask,  What  makes  you  put  all 
these  apples  into  one  class  and  to  recognize  an 
apple  when  you  see  it  ?  You  must  answer  that  all 
these  apples  have  certain  common  properties.  This, 
then,  is  the  reality  in  the  class.  The  class  verte- 
brate has  a  reality  in  the  vertebrate  column  which 
they  all  possess.  III.  When  the  object  is  real  the 
abstract  is  also  a  reality  in  the  thing ;  when  the 


Discursive  or  Deductive   Truth.  41 

things  generalized  are  real  the  concept  which  binds 
them  is  also  real. 

VI. 

In  the  proposition  we  must  carefully  consider 
how  the  two  terms  stand  toward  each  other.  We 
must  particularly  inquire  what  is  their  extension 
and  what  their  comprehension.  In  subalternation 
we  must  see  that  the  species  are  included  in  the 
genus.  In  conversion  the  rule  is  that  the  term  be 
not  more  extensive  in  the  conclusion  than  in  the 
premise. 

VII. 

In  Reasoning  Logic  teaches  us  to  look  to  our 
terms.  It  insists  that  there  be  three  and  only  three 
terms:  two  extremes  and  a  middle  which  unites 
them.  It  shows  us  that  they  can  be  put  in  the  form 
of  a  syllogism  if  the  reasoning  is  valid.  If  they  can- 
not it  is  a  proof  that  the  reasoning  is  not  valid. 

In  all  these  ways  Logic  gives  us  decisive  tests  to 
show  us  when  our  conclusions  follow  from  the 
premises. 

It  has  so  often  been  explained  that  it  scarcely 
needs  to  be  repeated,  that  Logic  does  not  give  us 
the  capacity  of  reasoning.  It  proceeds  on  the  idea 
that  we  reason  naturally  by  the  powers  which  God 
has  given  us.  It  shows  us  what  are  the  exact  proc- 


42          The   Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

esses  involved  and  thence  formulates  rules  to  guide 
us  to  truth  and  save  us  from  error. 

Logic  has  been  called  the  Grammar  of  Thought. 
Logic  is  not  the  same  as  Grammar,  but  it  is  analo- 
gous to  it.  Grammar  does  not  profess  to  teach  us 
how  to  speak  or  write,  but  it  explains  the  laws 
involved  and  teaches  how  to  speak  and  write  cor- 
rectly. So  Logic  does  not  claim  to  give  us  the 
power  of  thinking,  but  it  shows  us  how  to  think 
accurately,  and  to  correct  false  reasoning. 

Grammar  does  not  make  any  man  an  orator. 
Neither  does  Logic  make  man  a  powerful  reasoner. 
But  grammar  will  give  every  man  of  ordinary  in- 
telligence the  power  of  speaking  accurately.  Logic 
will  not  enable  every  man  to  reason  so  consecu- 
tively as  Aristotle  or  the  Apostle  Paul  or  Bishop 
Butler,  but  it  will  teach  every  man  of  common  un- 
derstanding to  reason  clearly  and  conclusively,  and 
thus  help  him  to  convince  his  audience.  It  is  not 
needful  that  the  orator  should  construe  his  sen- 
tences as  he  utters  them  ;  but  it  may  be  evident  all 
the  while  that  we  have  the  result  of  a  grammatical 
training  in  these  well-constructed  sentences.  So  it 
is  not  necessary  that  the  pleader  should  put  his 
argument  in  syllogistic  form,  but  it  may  be  seen  at 
every  step  that  he  is  giving  us  the  result  of  a 
thorough  logical  training. 


Inductive  Truths.  43 


LECTURE  THIRD. 
INDUCTIVE    TRUTHS. 

I. 
SCATTERED  FACTS. 

AN  eminent  man  is  reported  as  saying  that  there 
are  more  false  facts  than  false  theories.  There 
is  truth  in  this.  Facts  are  apt  to  have  adjuncts  to 
them  in  the  reports  given  by  others,  and  even  in 
our  own  apprehensions  of  them,  or  they  are  so  mu- 
tilated that  they  take  an  entirely  distorted  form. 
We  all  know  how,  in  story-telling,  additions  and 
subtractions  are  apt  to  be  made  even  by  honest 
narrators,  so  as  to  make  it  more  attractive  and 
picturesque. 

The  individual  facts  are  primarily  made  known 
by  the  senses.  In  these  there  may  be  very  numer- 
ous and  complicated  details,  and  any  of  these  if  left 
out  may  so  far  distort  our  apprehensions  and  the 
account  we  give  of  them.  Besides,  sensations,  feel- 
ings, fancies,  inferences,  attachments,  and  repug- 
nances may  mingle  with  our  pure  perception  of 
sense  and  cast  a  glow  or  a  gloom  around  them.  In 
these  sections  I  am  showing  that  we  have  to  guard 


44        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

against  these  temptations,  and  that  when  we  do  so 
we  can  arrive  at  positive  truth. 

Observation  Proper  and  Experiment. — These  are 
the  two  ways  in  which  we  obtain  facts.  In  the 
former  we  view  objects  simply  as  they  present  them- 
selves ;  in  the  latter  we  put  them  in  new  positions. 
The  advantage  of  Experiment  over  Observation 
Proper  (which  may  be  so  designated  as  Experi- 
ment is,  after  all,  a  kind  of  Observation)  is  that  it 
enables  us  to  perceive  the  proper  action  of  the  sev- 
eral agencies  joined  in  nature.  We  wish  to  know 
whether  bodies,  whatever  be  their  weight,  fall  to 
the  ground  in  equal  times.  Common  observation 
seems  to  show  that  they  do  not,  as  we  see  the  gold 
nugget  and  the  leaf  falling  at  very  different  times. 
But  we  put  the  gold  and  the  leaf  into  the  exhausted 
receiver  of  an  air-pump  and  find  them  fall  the  same 
instant.  What  we  should  do  in  all  observation  is 
to  note  precisely  what  has  occurred,  and  to  report 
it  accurately — without  any  additions,  subtractions,  or 
coloring;  we  must  be  especially  on  our  guard 
against  torturing  the  facts  in  order  to  make  them 
give  a  certain  kind  of  testimony. 

THE  SENSES. — The  older  Greek  philosophers 
adopted  the  common  opinion  that  the  senses  de- 
ceive. The  skeptics  took  advantage  of  the  doctrine 
and  argued  that  if  the  senses  deceive  there  is 


Inductive   Truths.  45 

nothing  we  can  trust  in.  The  sounder  philosophers 
met  them  by  calling  in  reason,  which  corrected  the 
illusions  of  the  senses  and  conducted  to  truth.  Aris- 
totle corrected  both  these  forms  of  error,  and 
showed  that  the  supposed  deception  arises,  not  from 
the  senses  themselves,  but  from  the  use  that  is 
made  of  their  intimations. 

To  save  the  senses  it  is  necessary  to  draw  certain 
distinctions.  In  particular  we  should  distinguish 
between  our  original  and  derived  perceptions.  The 
former  are  intuitive,  without  any  process  of  infer- 
ence, having  the  sanction  of  the  author  of  our  con- 
stitution, and  never  deceiving  us.  The  latter  imply 
inferences  from  the  revelations  of  sense  perception, 
and  there  may  be  errors  in  them. 

I  believe  we  can  approximately  determine  what 
are  the  original  perceptions  of  the  various  senses. 
By  several  of  the  senses  we  seem  to  perceive  merely 
the  bodily  organs  as  affected.  This  is  the  case  with 
taste  and  with  smell,  in  which  we  discern  simply  the 
palate  and  the  nostrils  with  a  certain  sensitive  ex- 
pression of  the  palate  and  the  nostrils.  It  is  the 
same  also,  I  believe,  with  hearing  and  with  touch 
proper,  or  feeling,  in  which  we  know  simply  an  affec- 
tion of  the  ear  and  the  periphery  of  the  body.  I 
rather  think  that  by  the  muscular  senses  and  the 
eye  we  discern  more ;  a  body  resisting  our  organ- 


46         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

ism  and  a  colored  surface  affecting  us.  In  all  these 
intuitive  perceptions  there  is  no  ratiocination,  and 
there  are  and  can  be  no  mistakes.  But  in  all  be- 
yond there  are  inferences,  and  in  these  there  may 
be  less  or  more  of  error.  A  person  tells  us  that  he 
had  mutton  to  dinner,  whereas  all  he  knew  was  that 
there  was  a  certain  taste  in  his  mouth  which  he 
argued  was  that  of  mutton.  He  further  lets  us 
know  that  he  felt  the  smell  of  roses  in  a  certain 
garden,  where  he  also  heard  a  flute  playing,  whereas 
immediately  he  felt  only  an  odor  in  his  nostrils  and 
a  sound  in  his  ear.  He  is  sure  that  he  was  struck 
in  the  dark  with  a  man's  hand,  whereas  the  blow 
was  from  a  stick.  He  depones  that  he  saw  a  man 
strike  his  wife,  while  all  he  saw  was  an  action  of 
one  figure  upon  another,  and  it  turns  out  that  the 
woman  was  not  the  man's  wife.  Hence  arise  some 
of  the  mistakes  in  witness-bearing;  they  are  not  lies 
of  the  senses,  but  errors  in  the  inferences  we  draw 
from  them. 

In  all  such  cases  we  form  a  general  rule  out  of 
certain  experiences,  and  in  hasty  thinking  we  ille- 
gitimately apply  it.  We  regard  sound  as  coming 
to  our  ear  in  a  straight  line  from  the  sounding  body, 
but  the  undulations  have  been  reflected  from  a  wall ; 
and  we  place  the  bell  from  which  they  have  come 
in  that  wall,  whereas  the  belfry  is  actually  in  a  dif- 


Inductive  Truths.  4Y 

ferent  direction.  It  is  on  this  principle  that  the 
ventriloquist  proceeds  when  he  makes  a  human 
voice  come  from  a  post  or  an  animal.  Having  laid 
down  the  rule  that  when  there  are  few  observable 
things  between  us  and  an  object  it  must  be  near, 
we  look  on  that  island  seen  across  the  sea  as  much 
closer  to  us  than  it  is. 

Some  other  distinctions  must  be  attended  to. 
Sensations  and  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain,  of 
beauty  and  ugliness,  associate  themselves  with  all 
our  perceptions,  and  are  apt  to  give  a  color  and 
even  a  shape  to  the  actual  things.  We  remember 
more  particulars  about  the  objects  that  excite  us, 
whether  joyously  or  grievously,  than  those  that  are 
dull  and  commonplace,  and  we  give  these  a  large, 
often  an  undue,  place  in  our  narrative,  and  thus  dis- 
tort them  and  give  them  a  different  meaning. 

The  rapid  inferences  from  the  intimations  of  the 
senses  may  at  times  serve  a  good  purpose.  They 
may  prepare  us  to  meet  and  avoid  danger  when 
cool  and  correct  argument  would  not  be  quick 
enough.  A  fire-bell,  the  jolt  of  a  carriage  in  which 
we  are  riding,  a  stumble  in  walking,  the  fog-whistle 
at  sea  may  at  times  raise  up  an  unnecessary  alarm, 
but  ,the  calm  reflection  which  succeeds  will  soon 
dissipate  this,  and  at  other  times  they  save  us  from 
danger. 


48        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

We  have  abundant  means  of  correcting  the  hasty 
judgments.  We  have  other  senses  at  hand  to  cor- 
rect the  apparent  deceptions  of  one  sense.  We 
imagine  the  figures  raised  optically  by  magicians  to 
be  real,  but  we  can  dissipate  the  illusion  by  thrust- 
ing our  hand  into  the  specter.  We  may  mistake 
beef  for  mutton  as  we  eat  it,  but  it  is  easy  to  apply 
to  the  person  who  prepared  the  food  to  set  us  right. 
A  diseased  eye  may  present  objects  double,  but  the 
touch  will  correct  the  mistake.  In  all  cases  we  can 
secure  that  what  is  told  us  by  the  senses  is  true  by 
judiciously  using  the  means  of  correction  at  our 
disposal. 

SELF -CONSCIOUSNESS.  —Metaphysicians  com- 
monly maintain  that  the  revelations  of  conscious- 
ness are  always  to  be  trusted  ;  that  they  settle 
every  thing  in  the  last  resort,  and  are,  in  fact,  ulti- 
mate and  infallible.  But  there  are  physiologists, 
and,  of  a  later  date,  even  metaphysicians,  who  assert 
that  the  acts  of  consciousness  are  variable  and  often 
deceitful.  They  show  us  that  people  often  misap- 
prehend what  their  real  feelings  are,  and  give  a 
wrong  account  of  them.  It  is  alleged  that  there 
are  persons  who  say  that  they  believe  certain  tenets 
when  they  do  not,  only  imagining  that  they  do. 
There  are  cases  of  persons  with  a  "  double  con- 
sciousness," as  it  is  called  ;  remembering,  in  the  one 


Inductive  Truths.      ,  49 

state,  the  experience  of  that  state,  but  without 
any  remembrance  of  it  in  the  other. 

But  in  all  such  cases  we  attribute  to  conscious- 
ness what  it  is  not  responsible  for.  In  regard  to 
the  inner,  as  in  regard  to  external,  sense,  we  have 
to  draw  distinctions  if  we  would  determine  their  pre- 
cise testimony.  It  is  acknowledged  by  all  psych- 
ologists that,  properly  speaking,  we  are  conscious 
of  self  only  in  its  present  state.  In  that  state  there 
are  various  affections:  there  are  sensations  and  feel- 
ings and  inferences  along  with  the  pure  conscious- 
ness, and  we  are  apt  to  mix  them  up  with  each 
other,  and  thereby  breed  confusion  in  our  appre- 
hensions and  in  the  account  we  give  of  what  is  in 
our  mind.  When  we  review  our  consciousness  we 
are  dependent  on  our  memory,  and  we  may  omit 
some  aspects  of  our  experience  and  add  associated 
affections.  Here,  as  in  regard  to  the  bodily  senses, 
distance  is  apt  to  lend  enchantment  to  the  view. 
The  hypochondriac  magnifies  his  sorrows,  and  the 
gay  youth  his  pleasures  in  the  past.  People  are  apt 
to  think  their  youth  was  happier  than  it  really  was  ; 
they  remember  their  joys  and  forget  their  little  dis- 
appointments, which  were  then  felt  to  be  so  great 
and  now  appear  so  little. 

What  is  so  called  is  not  really  "  double  conscious- 
ness." It  arises  from  a  diseased  state  of  the  brain 
4 


50        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

hindering  physical  action.  The  person  is  unable  to 
recall  what  has  been  laid  up  in  the  past,  and  he 
lives  in  the  present  and  lays  up  a  new  experience, 
which  he  uses  in  his  new  state,  but  which  he  may 
lose  in  a  later  condition  of  his  brain.  The  man  is 
not  under  a  double  consciousness,  but  in  two  states, 
in  each  of  which  the  consciousness  may  be  correct. 

It  thus  appears  that  man  may  trust  in  what  his 
consciousness  really  reveals.  It  makes  known  to  us 
self  in  its  present  state.  It  should  be  noticed  that 
it  does  not  know  merely  a  quality  of  self,  such  as 
thinking  or  feeling ;  it  knows  self  as  thinking  or 
feeling.  This  is  of  the  nature  of  a  first  truth  or  an 
intuition  ;  we  perceive  the  very  thing.  This  self 
constitutes  what  we  call  personality ;  that  is,  we 
know  ourselves  as  persons.  On  comparing  the  self 
as  presently  known  with  the  past  self  as  then  known 
we  declare  ourselves  to  be  the  same.  This  is  per- 
sonal identity ;  which  is  a  self-evident,  necessary, 
and  universal  truth. 

MEMORY. — The  vulgar  opinion  is  that  the  mem- 
ory may  deceive.  But  it  does  so  only  as  the  senses 
deceive.  The  mistakes  are  not  in  the  memory 
proper,  but  in  the  associated  affections  and  the  in- 
ferences drawn  from  them.  We  ask  a  man  how 
long  it  is  since  he  visited  us.  His  recollection  is 
dim,  and  he  makes  the  time  longer  than  it  is — six 


Inductive  Truths.  51 

years  instead  of  five.  It  is  not  possible  for  him  to 
remember  his  continued  existence  during  these 
years,  any  more  than  it  is  possible  for  the  eye  to 
see  every  point  in  space  between  us  and  objects  five 
or  six  miles  off.  In  both  cases  he  has  to  avail  him- 
self of  intervening  objects.  The  event,  he  remem- 
bers, took  place  after  his  marriage,  seven  years  ago, 
for  his  wife  was  with  him  ;  and  before  his  mother's 
death,  four  years  ago,  for  he  remembers  we  made 
inquiries  about  her  health.  But  he  does  not  recol- 
lect at  what  precise  date  between  these  two  occur- 
rences the  visit  was  paid.  The  reminiscence  was 
dim,  and  he  concludes  that  the  event  is  more  dis- 
tant than  it  really  is.  Our  memories  in  regard  to 
time  all  need  such  mile-stones,  or  rather  time- 
marks,  to  enable  us  to  measure  the  distances.  Now, 
in  all  these  processes  there  may  be  mistakes.  It  is 
much  the  same  with  our  recollections  of  the  other 
circumstances  connected  with  events,  such  as  the 
shape  and  color  of  objects,  their  position  in  relation 
to  other  things,  their  surroundings,  their  anteced- 
ents and  consequents.  The  vision  is  obscure  and 
we  have  to  fill  it  up,  and  we  do  so  by  fancies  of  our 
own,  which  so  far  modify  the  scene,  perhaps  per- 
vert it.  We  are  apt  to  join  causes  and  consequences 
with  the  bare  occurrences.  This  is  especially  apt 
to  be  the  case  with  conversations,  with  the  sentences 


52        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

uttered  by  ourselves  or  by  others.  We  recollect 
how  we  felt,  what  we  meant  to  say,  what  effect  was 
produced  on  us  by  what  others  said,  and  we  con- 
found these  with  what  was  actually  uttered.  Hence 
the  misunderstandings,  the  perversions  which  are  so 
apt  to  appear  in  the  reports  of  conversations.  In 
the  complicated  scenes  through  which  we  have  to 
pass  we  remember  those  parts  that  have  been  most 
vivid — these,  I  suppose,  have  impressed  themselves 
most  deeply  on  our  organism,  and  the  others  are 
feebler.  The  consequence  is  that  the  record  has 
faded  in  some  places,  and  we  make  additions  in 
order  to  complete  it.  In  this  way  we  clothe  our 
bare  memories  with  dresses  which  may  make  them 
look  sadder  or  more  joyful  than  the  events  really 
were  at  the  time. 

But  it  is  always  possible  to  distinguish  between 
our  original  and  proper  recollection  and  our  super- 
added  and  fictitious  ones.  Those  who  are  consci- 
entious will  be  careful  not  to  add  out  of  their  own 
stores  to  their  memories.  When  the  reminiscence 
is  dim  they  will  at  once  confess  it,  especially  in  wit- 
ness-bearing, and  when  the  character  of  a  fellow- 
man  may  be  affected.  In  all  scenes  which  we  wish 
to  remember  accurately  we  will  take  care  to  note 
the  exact  incidents  at  the  time  they  occur.  There 
are  events  of  which  we  are  certain  that  they  have 


Inductive  Truths.  53 

happened.  I  might  have  treated  of  testimony  here 
as  it  gives  us  facts  to  be  put  under  law,  but  as  the 
subject  is  to  be  fully  treated  in  Lecture  Fifth  I  re- 
fer it  to  that  place. 

II. 

INDUCTION. 

This  consists  essentially  in  gathering  facts  in 
order  to  ascertain  the  order  that  they  follow,  which 
will  be  found  to  consist  in  laws  which  they  obey. 
It  was  known  to  Aristotle  that  the  mind  starts 
with  the  singular  (TO  tmdarov)  before  it  rises  to  the 
universal  (TO  naBo^ov),  which,  as  he  expresses  it, 
may  be  first  in  the  order  of  nature,  while  the  singu- 
lars are  first  in  the  order  of  time.  He  practiced  the 
method  in  his  natural  history,  very  specially  by  the 
collections  which  were  supplied  by  his  pupil,  Alex- 
ander the  Great.  But  he  cannot  be  said  to  have  sys- 
tematically expounded  induction  as  a  method  of 
discovering  truth.  This  was  reserved  for  Francis  Ba- 
con, who  enjoined  that  in  observational  science  the 
mind  should  begin  with  particulars,  which  are  to  be 
collected  and  collated,  and  then  rise  to  minor,  mid- 
dle, and  major  axioms,  and  thence  finally  to  causes 
and  forms.  All  this  was  to  be  done  not  fler  sattum, 
but  by  gradual  steps.  The  method  has  since  been 
made  more  definite  by  Sir  John  Herschel,  in  his 


54        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

Natural  Philosophy  ;  by  Dr.  Whewell,  in  his  various 
works  on  The  Philosophy  of  the  Inductive  Sciences; 
specially  by  John  S.  Mill,  in  his  Logic,  and  by  others. 
The  method  will  become  more  perfected  as  science 
advances  with  its  observations  and  experiments,  with 
its  instruments  and  its  critical  examinations.  That 
method  has  a  Means  and  an  End.  The  Means  are 
observation  with  analysis.  The  End  is  the  dis- 
covery of  laws. 

III. 

Analysis  and  Synthesis. — By  the  former  we  sepa- 
rate a  concrete  or  complex  object  into  its  parts.  In 
chemistry  there  is  an  actual  separation  of  one  ele- 
ment from  another  ;  say  the  oxygen  from  the  hydro- 
gen with  which  it  is  combined  in  water.  But  in 
most  investigations  the  separation  is  in  thought. 
Thus  in  all  bodies  we  find  both  extension  and  en- 
ergy, which  cannot  be  separated  in  fact.  Thus 
logicians  analyze  discursive  thought  into  simple  ap- 
prehension, judgment,  and  reasoning,  or  in  the  ex- 
pression of  these  into  the  term,  the  proposition  and 
argument.  The  process  is  performed  by  abstrac- 
tion, in  which  we  contemplate  in  thought  a  part  of 
a  whole  presenting  itself,  more  particularly  an  at- 
tribute of  an  object,  say  gravitation.  In  analysis 
we  separate  the  whole  into  its  several  parts.  Ab- 


Inductive  Truths.  55 

straction  can  be  performed  on  every  object,  as  every 
object  has  more  than  one  quality,  and  we  can  fix 
on  any  one  of  these.  Analysis  can  be  performed 
only  when  we  have  such  an  acquaintance  with  an 
object  as  to  know  all  its  parts. 

The  exercise  of  abstraction,  and,  when  it  is  avail- 
able, of  analysis,  is  required  in  every  kind  of  inves- 
tigation. Bacon  speaks  of  induction  commencing 
with  "the  necessary  rejections  and  exclusions," 
that  is,  the  separating  of  the  matter  to  be  investi- 
gated from  the  extraneous  objects  with  which  it 
may  be  associated  in  nature.  Whately  says  (Logic) 
that  in  teaching  a  science  the  analytical  mode  is 
the  more  interesting,  easy,  and  natural  kind  of  in- 
troduction, as  being  the  form  in  which  the  first  in- 
vention or  discovery  of  any  kind  of  system  must 
originally  have  taken  place.  Whewell  gives  an  apt 
name  to  the  procedure,  which  he  recommends  as 
the  "  Decomposition  of  Facts."  It  serves  not  only 
to  separate  objects  from  others,  but  to  break  them 
down,  so  that  we  may  obtain  a  better  acquaintance 
with  them — with  their  internal  structure  and  their 
several  qualities.  It  is  a  process  to  be  employed 
throughout  in  all  investigations  of  nature,  which  in 
every  department  is  full  of  complexities. 

Analysis  can  scarcely  be  described  as  discovering 
truth.  It  is  rather  a  means  or  instrument  toward 


56        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

this  end.  At  the  same  time  it  should  be  noticed 
that  when  we  abstract  a  part,  say  a  quality,  from 
an  object,  the  part,  the  quality,  has  a  reality  as  well 
as  the  whole.  If  the  concrete  be  real  the  abstract 
is  also  real.  The  abstract  may  not  have  an  inde- 
pendent reality ;  thus  gravitation  has  no  reality  ex- 
cept in  body,  but  it  has  a  reality  in  body.  The 
criterion  here  is  that  the  part  be  really  a  part  of  the 
actual  whole ;  that  the  quality  be  a  real  attribute  of 
a  real  thing. 

Analysis  is  a  sharp,  and  may  become  a  dangerous, 
instrument.  It  may  be  over  subtle,  and  dissect  and 
kill  what  should  be  kept  alive  and  entire.  It  is  ful- 
filling its  end  only  when,  to  use  an  illustration  of 
Plato's,  it  is  dividing  the  carcass  as  the  butcher 
does,  according  to  the  joints.  Among  the  ancient 
Greek  philosophers  the  analytic  was  the  method 
commonly  employed.  Down  to  this  last  age  the 
analytic  and  the  synthetic  were  represented  as 
methods  of  discovering  truth,  and  had  large  fields 
allotted  to  them.  Kant's  great  work,  the  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason,  is  divided  into  the  analytic  and 
synthetic  parts. 

In  synthesis  the  parts  are  put  together  to  show 
that  they  make  up  the  whole.  Thus  Whately  de- 
composes discursive  thought  into  the  term  propo- 
sition and  argument,  and  then  shows  synthetically 


Inductive  Truths.  57 

that  these  make  up  the  whole  process.  Sir  John 
Herschel,  in  his  Astronomy,  begins  with  taking  up 
the  several  departments  of  the  heavens,  and  then 
expounds  the  whole  science.  The  two,  analysis 
and  synthesis,  must  continue  to  be  used  as  instru- 
ments, but  they  now  do  so  in  the  methods  of  in- 
duction and  deduction. 

IV. 

CRITERIA.  OF  LAWS. 

Hitherto  we  have  had  to  do  with  individual  facts, 
which  tell  us  nothing  beyond  themselves.  We  have 
not  as  yet  any  means  of  anticipating  the  future 
from  the  past,  or  gathering  wisdom  from  experience. 
In  particular  we  have  no  science  ;  which  consists,  not 
of  scattered  and  isolated  facts,  but  of  systematized 
knowledge.  In  the  construction  of  science  we  must 

o 

co-ordinate  the  facts.  In  doing  so  we  discover  the 
laws,  and  find  that  all  mundane  affairs  are  regulated 
by  laws. 

But  the  question  arises,  How  do  we,  from  indi- 
vidual facts,  reach  a  law  ?  Or,  more  specifically  for 
our  present  purpose,  When  are  we  entitled  to  con- 
clude and  be  satisfied  that  we  have  found  a  law 
which  may  be  regarded  as  general  or  universal  ? 
The  answer  of  those  who  have  not  thought  specially 
on  the  subject  would  be,  When  we  have  observed 


58        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

all  the  facts.  But  a  moment's  reflection  shows  that 
in  most  cases,  I  believe  in  all,  we  cannot  find  out 
all  the  facts.  We  assert  that  crows  are  black,  but 
we  cannot  go  the  round  of  the  world  and  ascertain 
that  it  is  so.  We  may  have  examined  millions  of 
cases  and  found  all  crows  black,  but  how  do  we 
know  that  a  traveler  may  not  report  that  he  has 
found  a  white  crow  in  some  distant  island?  In 
science  we  say  that  all  mammals  are  warm-blooded, 
or  that  all  matter  attracts  other  matter  inversely 
according  to  the  square  of  the  distance  ;  but  no  one 
has  searched  the  universe  and  noticed  every  mam- 
mal and  every  particle  of  matter  so  as  to  be  able  to 
say  that  no  mammal  is  cold-blooded,  and  no  particle 
of  matter  without  the  power  of  attraction.  But 
from  a  limited  number  of  observations  we  can  rise 
to  a  law  which  seems  to  be  universal.  How  is  it 
so?  Mr.  Mill  maintains  that  he  who  can  answer 
this  question  is  wiser  than  the  ancients. 

Bacon  describes  the  method  of  observation  by 
"  perfect  innumeration  "  of  cases  as  puerile,  and  in- 
capable of  yielding  any  fruitful  results.  In  induc- 
tion we  have  to  rise  from  the  unknown  to  the 
known.  We  argue  from  a  limited  number  of  cases 
in  the  past  to  a  universal  law  which  we  hold  to  be 
true  in  the  future ;  not  only  so,  but  in  all  unknown 
cases,  past  and  present.  The  father  of  inductive 


Inductive  Truths.  59 

philosophy  was  aware  of  the  difficulty  of  the  prob- 
lem, and  he  sought  to  solve  it  by  bringing  in  Pre- 
rogative Instances  (Prerogatives  Instantiarutn)  which 
could  determine  what  is  true  of  all  instances.  To 
give  only  one  example,  that  of  Instantia  Cruets,  the 
metaphor  being  taken  from  the  notice  put  up  where 
two  roads  meet  to  tell  which  to  take.  It  was  dis- 
puted whether  light  consists  of  material  particles  or 
of  vibrations  in  an  ether.  To  settle  this  it  was 
maintained  by  Fresnel  that  instances  can  be  arti- 
ficially produced  which  are  inconsistent  with  the 
material,  but  not  with  the  undulatory  theory.  But 
we  have  now  better  tests  in  the  Canons  of  Induction. 
When  man  looks  abroad  on  nature  in  a  loose  way 
he  sees  a  number  of  scattered  facts.  At  first  sight 
it  looks  as  if  they  have  two  characteristics ;  they 
have  both  irregularity  and  they  have  regularity.  He 
soon  begins  to  seek  for  order  in  the  midst  of  the 
seeming  disorder.  He  is  impelled  to  this  by  his  in- 
tellectual powers,  which  prompt  him  to  seek  for  the 
nature  and  relation  of  things.  But  he  is  specially 
led  into  this  inquiry  by  finding  that  he  cannot  make 
good  and  profitable  use  of  nature  till  he  knows  how 
it  acts.  He  will  not  sow  grain  at  one  season  unless 
he  knows  that  he  will  reap  for  his  sustenance  at  an- 
other season.  In  prosecuting  such  inquiries  he  dis- 
covers that  order  prevails  in  the  midst  of  apparent 


60        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

confusion.  He  calls  the  regular  proceedings  by  the 
name  of  laws,  believing  that  they  are  the  expres- 
sion of  the  will  of  a  law-giver.  "  They  continue  this 
day  according  to  thine  ordinances,  for  all  are  thy 
servants."  But  it  is  not  enough  that  he  knows  that 
there  are  laws.  In  order  to  take  advantage  of  them 
he  needs  to  ascertain  their  precise  nature.  He 
would  determine  the  number  of  days  in  the  year, 
the  periods  of  the  returns  of  the  seasons  and  of  the 
the  moon.  While  he  is  seeking  after  these  regu- 
larities he  finds  that  there  is  a  deeper  and  higher 
law  in  nature  ;  there  is  not  only  a  law  of  order,  there 
is  a  law  of  power.  Prompted  by  an  internal  intu- 
ition, confirmed  by  a  uniform  and  unvarying  ex- 
perience, he  concludes,  that  every  event  in  nature 
has  a  cause,  not  only  in  God,  who  works  in  all  the 
agents  in  nature,  but  in  some  power  in  nature. 

The  object  of  all  science  is  to  discover  order,  or, 
in  other  words,  laws.  But  there  is  great  confusion 
in  the  statement  that  all  things  are  governed  by  laws. 
This  will  not  be  cleared  up  till  we  distinguish  be- 
tween two  kinds  of  laws.  The  Laws  of  Uniformity 
and  the  Law  of  Causation. 

V. 

I.  LAWS  OF  UNIFORMITY. 

There  is  an  order  in  nature,  in  other  words,  laws 
in  nature  which  we  can  observe  and  profit  by  with- 


Inductive  Truths.  61 

out  at  all  looking  to  the  causes,  though  we  shall  see 
that  they  have  causes.  They  will  best  be  under- 
stood by  some  examples.  There  is  the  succession 
of  day  and  night.  Day  does  not  cause  night  nor 
night  cause  day.  Yet  they  follow  each  other  in- 
variably. It  is  the  same  with  the  seasons — spring, 
summer,  autumn,  and  winter — no  one  of  which  pro- 
duces its  successor,  though  it  prepares  for  it.  There 
is  the  life  of  the  plant — the  seed,  the  blade,  the 
flower,  the  fruit.  There  is  the  growth  of  the  ani- 
mal— the  germ,  the  birth,  infancy,  mature  life,  decay, 
old  age.  There  are  periodical  occurrences — the 
trade-winds,  the  gulf-strearn,  the  evening  sea- 
breezes.  There  are  the  epochs  in  geology — the 
Azoic,  the  Eozoic,  the  Silurian,  the  Devonian,  the 
Carboniferous,  the  Mezozoic,  the  Cenozoic,  the  Quat- 
ernary, the  Human.  There  are  the  eras  in  history — 
as,  in  Jewish  history,  the  Antediluvian  Period,  the 
Patriarchal,  the  Exodus,  Government  by  Judges, 
Government  by  Kings,  the  Captivity,  the  Coming  of 
Christ,  the  Dispersion  of  the  Jews. 

But  there  is  a  deeper  principle  involved. 

VI. 

II.  THE  LAW  OF  CAUSE  AND  EFFECT. 
I  believe  this  to  be  an  intuitive  principle,  stand- 
ing  the    tests   above    enunciated.     I  believe   that 


62        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

when  we  discover  any  thing  beginning  to  be  we 
look  for  an  antecedent  producing  it — a  substance 
with  power.  But  without  entering  at  this  place  on 
this  disputed  metaphysical  subject,  I  may  take  it 
for  granted  that  the  principle  of  causation  is  sanc- 
tioned by  a  universal  experience,  and  will  not  be 
denied  by  any  one,  Many,  indeed,  feel  that  the 
principle  may  require  to  be  enunciated  anew  and 
put  in  a  better  form  since  the  discovery  of  the  law 
of  the  Conservation  of  Energy,  or  the  Persistence 
of  Force,  as  Herbert  Spencer  calls  it.  But  what- 
ever be  the  best  shape  in  which  to  put  it,  we  assume 
in  all  induction  that  causes  produce  their  proper 
effect,  and  that  every  new  product  or  change  in  an 
old  thing  has  a  cause.  One  of  the  aims  of  induct- 
ive science  is  to  discover  what  has  caused  a  given 
phenomenon;  what  has  produced  it  in  the  past  and 
will  produce  it  again.  The  principle  of  causation 
might  have  reigned  in  all  nature  and  yet  there  have 
been  no  uniformity.  All  action  in  nature  might 
have  as  its  sole  cause  the  fiat  of  God.  The  con- 
nection of  all  things  would,  in  this  case,  be  with 
God,  but  not  with  one  another.  The  spring,  with 
its  buds  and  blossoms,  would  be  produced  by  God, 
but  this  would  give  no  security  that  the  fruits  of 
autumn  were  to  follow.  Or,  again,  there  might  be 
constant  interferences  by  God  with  the  operation  of 


Inductive  Truths.  63 

natural  agents ;  or  causal  agents  might  work,  and 
yet  there  be  no  such  thing  as  the  general  laws,  such 
as  the  seasons,  which  we  observe  and  trust  in.  We 
find,  instead,  that  the  agents  of  nature  are  so  dis- 
posed or  arranged  that  they  produce  uniformities, 
not  the  result  of  any  one  cause,  but  of  a  combina- 
tion and  harmony  of  causes  ;  such  as  the  periodicity 
of  the  heavenly  bodies,  the  flow  of  the  tides,  the 
regular  return  of  the  seasons,  the  plant  rising  from 
a  seed  and  producing  a  seed,  and  the  descent  of 
the  animal  from  a  parent,  its  growth  and  its  death. 
All  these  imply  causation,  but  theyjequire  more— 
an  adjusted  causation. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  settle  more  definitely  what 
is  implied  in  the  uniformity  of  nature  which  lies  at 
the  basis  of  all  induction.  It  implies,  first,  that 
there  is  a  certain  number  of  agents  acting  in  nature  ; 
it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  settle  how  many.  Sec- 
ondly, that  these  are  so  collocated  or  arranged — I 
believe,  adjusted — as  to  produce  general  results, 
called  laws,  which  we  observe  and  act  upon  and  can 
scientifically  express.  Thirdly,  these  agents  con- 
stitute nature,  and  there  is  no  introduction  of  new 
agents  and  no  interference  with  them  in  ordinary 
circumstances.  This  statement  does  not  preclude 
miracles  on  rare  occasions  ;  these  miracles  not  being 
contrary  to  the  law  of  causation,  for  they  have  the 


64        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

power  of  God  as  a  cause,  but  they  are  simply  an  ex- 
ception to  the  uniformities  of  nature.  These  two 
classes  differ  from  each  other,  yet  they  are  closely 
connected.  The  laws  of  uniformity  proceed  from 
the  law  of  causality.  It  is  the  disposition  of  the 
sun  and  earth  that  produces  day  and  night  and 
the  seasons.  There  are  causes  within  and  without 
the  plant  and  animal  which  produce  development. 
The  sea  and  land  breezes  have  been  produced  by 
meteorological  agencies. 

CANONS  OF  INDUCTION. — There  seem  to  be  three 
grand  ends  which  men  of  science  have  in  view  in 
their  investigations :  One  is  to  discover  the  com- 
position of  the  objects  around  us;  the  second  is  to 
discover  natural  classes ;  the  third  is  to  discover 
causes. 

Canons  of  Decomposition. — Almost  all  the  ob- 
jects we  meet  with  in  the  world,  whether  material 
or  mental,  are  composite.  It  is  the  aim  of  many 
departments  of  science,  in  particular  of  chemistry 
and  psychology,  to  analyze  them.  This  can,  so  far, 
be  effectively  done.  There  are  certain  rules  to 
guide  us,  and  these  may  be  made  more  and  more 
specific  as  the  analytic  sciences  advance. 

A.  We  must  separate  the  object  we  wish  to  de- 
compose from  all  other  objects.  If  we  wish  to  ana- 
lyze water  we  must  have  pure  water,  separate  from 


Inductive  Truths.  65 

all  other  ingredients.  If  we  wish  to  analyze  intu- 
ition or  reasoning,  we  must  separate  it  from  all 
associated  observations  and  fancies. 

B.  When  we  have  found  the  composition  of  any 
piece  or  portion  of  a  substance  we  have  determined 
the  composition  of  every  other  part,  and,  indeed, 
of  the  whole.     When  we  have   ascertained  that  a 
pint  of  water  is  formed  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen  we 
have  settled  that  water  every-where  is  composed  of 
the  same  elements.     This  arises  from  the  circum- 
stance that  every  substance  in  nature  has  its  prop- 
erties, which   it    retains.      Having  detected   these 
properties  in  one  case,  we  have  found  what  they 
are  in  all. 

C.  The  elements  reached  are  to  be  regarded  as 
being  so  only  provisionally.     We  are  not  sure  that 
in  any  cases  we  have  found  the  ultimate  elements 
of  bodies.     At  present  it  is  supposed  that  there  are 
some  seventy  elements,  but  we  are  not  sure  of  any 
one   of  these  that  it   will  never  be  resolved  into 
simpler  substances.     Meanwhile  the  chemical  analy- 
sis is  correct  so  far  as  it  goes.     It  will  always  hold 
true  that  water  is  composed  of  oxygen  and  hydro- 
gen, though  it  is  possible  that  oxygen  or  hydrogen, 
one    or  both,   may    be   resolved   into    something 
simpler. 

Canons  of  Natural  Classes. — There  are    certain 


66        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

sciences  which  are  called  by  Whewell  Classificatory. 
They  are  such  as  botany,  zoology,  and  mineralogy. 
We  may  have  two  ends  in  view  in  classifying. 
One  may  be  simply  to  aid  the  memory  by  having 
the  innumerable  objects  of  nature  put  into  a  con- 
venient number  of  groups.  For  this  purpose  we 
fix  on  certain  obvious  and  convenient  character- 
istics and  put  all  the  objects  possessing  them  into 
one  class.  It  was  thus  that  Linnaeus  put  under  one 
head  all  plants  possessing  the  same  number  of  sta- 
mens and  pistils.  This  arrangement,  though  it 
does  not  come  up  to  the  requisitions  of  a  perfect 
classification,  is  found  to  be  very  convenient.  Sec- 
ond, our  object  may  be  to  increase  our  knowledge 
by  so  arranging  objects  that  one  characteristic  may 
be  a  sign  of  others.  In  natural  classification  we 
should  always  aim  at  securing  both  these  ends. 
There  are  canons  which  may  assist  us  in  determin- 
ing when  we  have  reached  natural  classes. 

A.  We  must  have  observed  the  resemblance  in 
many  and  varied  cases,  say  in  different  countries 
and  at  different  times. 

B.  We  must  be  in  a  position  to  say  that  if  there 
had   been   exceptions  we   must   have   met    them. 
These  two  rules  guard  against  forming  a  law  from 
a  limited  class  of  facts. 

C.  There  are  classes  in  nature  called  Kinds,  in 


Inductive  Truths.  67 

which  the  possession  of  one  quality  is  a  mark  of  a 
number  of  others.  All  classes  entitled  to  be  called 
natural  are  more  or  less  of  this  description.  Thus 
mammals  are  so  designated  because  they  suckle 
their  young ;  but  this  characteristic  is  a  mark  of  a 
number  of  others — that  the  animals  are  warm- 
blooded, and  have  four  compartments  in  their 
hearts.  Reptiles  are  recognized  as  producing  their 
young  by  eggs,  but  they  are  also  marked  as  having 
three  compartments  in  their  hearts  and  being  cold- 
blooded. 

Canons  of  Causes. — The  most  lucid  and,  upon  the 
whole,  the  clearest  and  most  satisfactory  exposition 
of  these  methods  is  by  Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill  in  his 
Logic.  It  should  be  noticed  that  his  methods  re- 
late to  causes,  and  we  have  not  had  from  him  an 
exposition  of  the  canons  of  decomposition  and 
classes  as  given  above.  He  mentions  four  or  five 
methods. 

A.  The  Method  of  Agreement. — In  the  spring 
season  we  see  innumerable  buds,  leaves,  and  blos- 
soms appearing  upon  the  plants,  and  we  find  the 
common  cause  to  be  the  heat  of  the  sun  shining 
more  directly  upon  the  earth.  The  canon  is,  "  If 
two  or  more  effects  have  only  one  antecedent  in 
common  that  antecedent  is  the  cause,  or,  at  least, 
part  of  the  cause."  That  canon  is  too  loose  to 


68        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

admit  of  a  universal  application,  as  we  may  not  be 
sure  that  the  point  of  agreement  we  have  fixed  on 
is  the  only  one.  Two  people  take  the  same  dis- 
ease at  the  same  time ;  we  conclude  that  the  cause 
is  the  same — but  it  may  have  been  different. 

B.  The  Method  of  Difference. — In  the  very  middle 
of  the  day  I  find  the  scene  around  me  on  the  earth 
suddenly  darkened.  There  must  be  a  cause.  I  find 
that  the  moon  has  come  between  us  and  the  sun, 
and  this  seems  the  only  difference  between  the  two 
states — the  one  in  which  every  thing  was  bright  and 
the  other  in  which  it  is  in  gloom.  The  canon  is, 
"  If  in  comparing  one  case  in  which  the  effect  takes 
place  and  another  in  which  it  does  not  take  place 
we  find  the  latter  to  have  every  antecedent  in  com- 
mon with  the  former  except  one,  that  one  circum- 
stance is  the  cause  of  the  former,  or,  at  least,  part 
of  the  cause."  This  method  is  the  one  employed 
in  cases  in  which  experiment,  with  its  separating 
power,  is  available.  It  is  the  most  decisive  of  all 
tests  when  the  circumstances  admit  of  its  applica- 
tion. This  canon  regulates  many  cases  in  common 
life.  I  am  usually  in  good  health,  but  I  took  rich 
food  yesterday  and  was  unwell,  the  cause  being  evi- 
dently the  food.  A  man  in  health  receives  a  gun- 
shot wound  and  dies.  We  see  at  once  that  the 
wound  was  the  cause  of  the  death.  There  are  cases 


Inductive  Truths.  69 

in  which  this  method  is  not  applicable  when  an  in- 
termediate one  is  available. 

C.  The  Indirect  Method  of  Difference,  or  the  Joint 
Met 'hod  of  Agreement  and  Difference. — The  canon  is, 
"  If  two  or  more  cases  in  which  the  phenomenon  oc- 
curs have  only  one  antecedent  in  common,  while  two 
or  more  instances  in  which  it  does  not  occur  have 
nothing  in  common  but  the  absence  of  that  anteced- 
ent, the  circumstance  in  which  alone  the  two  sets  of 
cases  differ  is  the  cause,  or  part  of  the  cause,  of  the 
phenomenon."     The  illustration  given  by  Mr.  Mill 
is :  "  All  animals  which  have  a  well-developed  re- 
spiratory system,  and  therefore  aerate   the  blood, 
perfectly  agree  in  being  warm-blooded,  while  those 
whose  respiratory  system  is  imperfect  do  not  main- 
tain a  temperature  much    exceeding   that  of  the 
surrounding  medium ;  we  may  argue  from  the  two- 
fold experience  that  the  change  which  takes  place 
in  the  blood  by  respiration  is  the  cause  of  animal 
heat."     There  are  two  countries  in  much  the  same 
condition  physically,  in  the  one  of  which  there  are 
Christian  agencies,  and  in  the  other  none ;    in  the 
former  there  is  much  higher  refinement  and  civil- 
ization than  in  the  latter,  and  the  cause  is  evidently 
the  Christian  religion. 

D.  The  Method  of  Concomitant   Variations. — We 
want  to  know  the  cause  of  the  rise  of  water  in  a 


70        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

pump  or  of  mercury  in  a  barometer.  The  ancients 
accounted  for  this  by  nature's  horror  of  a  vacuum, 
which  is  inconsistent  with  the  fact  that  water  will 
not  rise  above  a  certain  number  of  feet  in  the  pump. 
Torricelli  and  Pascal  gave  a  better  explanation 
when  they  referred  the  rising  of  the  water  or  mer- 
cury to  the  weight  of  the  incumbent  atmosphere, 
which  Pascal  proved  by  ascending  a  mountain  with 
a  barometer  and  finding  that,  as  he  rose  higher  and 
higher,  the  mercury  fell  lower  and  lower  in  the 
tube.  Here  we  have  the  effect  varying  with  its 
alleged  cause,  which  is  an  evidence  that  the  alleged 
cause  is  a  true  one.  The  canon  is,  "  Whenever  an 
effect  varies  according  as  its  alleged  cause  varies, 
that  alleged  cause  may  be  regarded  as  the  true 
cause,  or,  at  least,  as  proceeding  from  the  true 
cause."  In  a  certain  town  there  is  an  increase  of 
crime  ;  at  the  same  time  there  has  been  an  increase 
of  drunkenness,  and  we  at  once  refer  the  increase 
of  crime  to  the  increase  of  drunkenness.  In  the  far 
West  the  manners  of  the  first  settlers,  being  com- 
monly young  men,  are  apt  to  be  rough  ;  but  they 
seek  out  refined  ladies  for  their  wives  and  their 
manners  become  refined.  In  the  same  region  there 
are  at  first  few  churches  and  schools  ;  these  are 
gradually  introduced  and  there  is  an  improvement 
in  the  morals  of  the  people. 


Inductive  Truths.  *l\ 

E.  The  Method  of  Residues. — A  farmer  knows  how 
much  grain  a  particular  field  has  yielded  in  the  past. 
He  mixes  fertilizers  with  the  earth  on  the  field  and 
finds  he  has  a  larger  crop,  and  he  ascribes  the  in- 
crease to  the  fertilizers.  He  knows  what  the  previ- 
ously existing  antecedents  will  produce,  and,  after 
subtracting  this,  he  ascribes  the  residue  to  the  new 
antecedent.  The  canon  is,  "  Subtract  from  an 
effect  whatever  is  known  to  proceed  from  certain 
antecedents,  and  the  residue  must  be  the  effect  of 
the  remaining  antecedents."  We  know  what  are 
the  orbits  in  which  the  planets  move,  but  the  planet 
Uranus  was  found  by  Leverrier  and  Adams  to  de- 
part so  far  from  the  laws.  There  was  a  residue 
which  could  not  be  accounted  for,  and  so  they 
looked  out  for  and  found  a  new  planet.  We  may 
proceed  on  the  same  principle  to  argue  the  exist- 
ence of  a  conscience.  We  have  a  sense  of  merit 
and  demerit ;  we  find  that  this  cannot  be  given  by 
the  senses  or  intellect,  and  to  explain  the  phenome- 
non we  call  in  a  moral  power. 

VIII. 
PSYCHOLOGY. 

Here,  as  well  as  in  all  the  physical  sciences,  we 
have  to  begin  with  the  observation  of  facts.  There 
is,  however,  an  .important  difference  between  the 


72        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

two  departments.  The  facts  in  physical  sciences 
are  obtained  by  the  senses  ;  whereas  in  mental 
science  the  observing  agent  is  self-consciousness. 
It  is  only  thus  we  can  find  out  what  any  physical 
act  is.  An  examination  of  the  nerves  and  brain 
may  show  how  a  mental  state  arises,  but  can  give 
no  idea  of  the  mental  act  itself,  say  of  a  sensation, 
a  recollection,  an  imagination,  of  moral  approba- 
tion, of  emotion  or  wish.  In  making  conscious- 
ness our  witness  we  have  to  allot  to  it  a  large 
province.  We  must  include  in  it  not  only  immedi- 
ate introspection,  but  also  the  observation  of  the 
mental  acts  of  others,  as  disclosed  in  their  words, 
their  writings,  and  their  deeds.  We  cannot,  in- 
deed, look  directly  into  the  bosoms  of  our  fellow- 
men  so  as  to  ascertain  what  is  passing  within,  but 
we  can  gather  what  this  is  by  the  expression  of  it, 
which,  be  it  observed,  we  can  understand  because  we 
are  conscious  of  our  own  acts.  History,  biography, 
travels,  plays,  novels,  newspapers,  and  especially 
conversation  and  familiar  letters,  may  all  show  us 
human  nature  quite  as  much  as  they  do  external 
incidents.  Without  these  supplements  we  should 
have  a  very  contracted  view  of  the  mind  by  inspec- 
tion of  our  own  souls. 

The    individual    facts    are   made   known  in  this 
way.     The  criterion  of  consciousness  is  in  itself;    it 


Inductive  Truths.  73 

is  self-evidencing.  As  we  observe  the  facts  we  dis- 
tinguish between  those  that  differ  and  co-ordinate 
them  into  laws.  The  criteria  of  the  laws  are  much 
the  same  as  those  of  physical  science. 

Psychology  proceeds  on  the  same  two  funda- 
mental principles  as  physics.  It  is  seeking  for 
causes.  Without  determining  the  question  of  the 
freedom  of  the  will  we  may  confidently  affirm  that 
causation,  that  the  persistence  of  force,  rules  in  the 
mind  as  it  does  in  the  body.  Certain  antecedents 
are  sure  to  be  followed  by  certain  consequences. 
The  orator  urges  the  considerations  which  may  per- 
suade those  whom  he  is  addressing  and  lead  them 
to  action.  The  poet  raises  up  images  that  please 
and  elevate  the  mind.  The  father  and  the  teacher 
inculcate  principles  which  may  guide  the  young  in 
all  their  future  lives.  Investigators  in  this  depart- 
ment have  been  seeking  to  discover  faculties  and 
the  rule  and  mode  of  their  operation.  The  early 
Greeks  found  sensation,  the  discursive  power,  and 
reason.  Aristotle  had  in  the  soul  the  nutritive 
power,  sensation,  memory,  phantasy,  and,  above 
these,  the  reason,  active  and  passive.  In  all  ages 
there  has  been  a  grand  distinction  drawn,  in  a  loose 
form,  between  the  intellect  and  the  will,  the  cog- 
nitive and  the  motive  powers.  Every  body  talks  of 
the  memory,  the  judgment,  of  reasoning,  and  of 


H        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

sentiment  and  feeling,  of  the  power  of  abstract- 
ing, generalizing,  distinguishing,  of  loving,  and  of 
hating. 

There  seem,  also,  to  be  laws  of  uniformity  in  human 
nature.  It  does  not  appear  that  in  the  association 
of  ideas  one  idea  is  the  cause  of  that  which  succeeds  ; 
that  when  height  suggests  hollow  and  the  dwarf 
suggests  the  giant,  and  prosperity  adversity,  and  a 
portrait  the  original,  that  when  we  count  up  from 
one  to  one  hundred,  there  is  a  causal  connection 
between  the  ideas — they  are  the  joint  effect  of  a 
number  of  causes.  In  the  science  of  psychology  we 
seek  to  discover  these  laws,  such  as  the  law  of 
habit,  the  connection  between  the  idea  and  the  feel- 
ing raised  by  it,  the  kind  of  acts  which  conscience 
approves  of. 

Now,  there  may  be  criteria  of  these  laws,  both  of 
causation  and  uniformity.  These  have  not  been  so 
carefully  enunciated  as  those  of  physical  science.  I 
believe  that,  mutatis  mutandis,  they  may  be  con- 
sidered as  very  much  the  same. 

The  Method  of  Agreement.— Washington  is  named 
and  we  find  the  mind  following  a  certain  train.  We 
think  of  his  education,  his  training,  the  Revolution, 
his  battles,  his  character,  all  of  which  have  been 
previously  in  the  mind  together,  and  we  reach  the 
law  of  contiguity:  that  when  ideas  have  been  in  the 


Inductive 

mind  at  the  same  time,  when  one  comes  up  the 
others  are  apt  to  follow. 

The  Method  of  Difference. — We  see  a  portrait  of 
Washington  lor  the  first  time.  The  two,  the  por- 
trait and  Washington,  were  never  before  in  the 
mind  together,  yet  the  portrait  calls  up  Washing- 
ton, and  the  law  is,  things  that  are  related,  especially 
things  that  are  like,  recall  each  other. 

The  Joint  Method  of  Agreement  and  Difference. — 
There  are  days  in  which  we  find  we  can  easily  re- 
call the  things  we  would  remember,  other  days  in 
which  they  will  not  come  up.  The  difference  is  in 
the  time :  that  in  the  first  few  days  our  brain  was 
in  perfect  health ;  in  the  other  it  is  distracted. 

Method  of  Concomitant  Variations. — When  we 
are  interested  in  an  event  known  to  us  we  are  apt 
to  think  of  it  more  frequently,  and  we  conclude  that 
feeling,  as  a  secondary  law,  influences  our  associ- 
ations, and,  according  to  the  feeling  with  which  it  is 
accompanied,  so  do  ideas  come  up. 

Method  of  Residues. — On  contemplating  kind 
actions  we  feel  a  pleasure  which  can  be  explained 
by  our  social  feelings ;  but  we  find  that  on  contem- 
plating some  of  these  we  have  a  feeling  of  moral 
approbation.  This  cannot  be  explained  by  the 
mere  social  feeling,  and  we  have  to  call  in  a  moral 
principle. 


76        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

IX. 

REASONING  IN  INDUCTION. 

The  question  is  started,  Is  there  reasoning  in  in- 
duction ?  I  am  sure  that  there  is.  From  what 
has  been  ascertained  by  observation  taken  in  a 
wide  sense  we  infer  something  else — that  there  is  a 
law  which  enables  us  to  predict  results. 

How  is  it  that  the  countryman  is  enabled  to 
predict  a  coming  storm?  His  father  has  told  him, 
or  he  himself  has  observed,  that  when  the  wind  is 
in  the  East,  and  the  clouds  are  thick  and  black, 
there  will  probably  be  rain  or  wind.  Here  there  is 
evidently  inference  which  can  be  stated  syllogistic- 
ally  by  the  logician,  the  general  observation  being 
the  major  premise,  the  particular  state  of  the  wind 
and  sky  the  minor,  and  the  conclusion  that  there 
will  be  a  storm.  Every  class  of  men,  in  fact  all 
men,  do  thus  reason  on  premises  implied,  though 
possibly  not  expressed.  The  laborer  argues,  in  his 
own  way,  that  there  should  be  a  rise  of  wages ;  the 
merchant  purchases  because  he  concludes  there  will 
be  a  demand  for  his  goods.  Before  there  were  any 
precise  rules  laid  down  on  the  subject  scientific 
men  drew  true  and  important  conclusions  from 
common-sense  principles  in  their  own  mind.  The 
canons  of  induction  now  expressed  definitely  enable 


Inductive  Truths.  T7 

us  to  put  the  reasoning  in  a  more  systematic  form, 
which  is  a  great  advantage.  We  can  now  use  the 
canons  of  induction  (which,  I  believe,  will  become 
more  definite  and  better  expressed)  as  our  majors 
in  the  syllogism  of  induction. 

Major.  When  two  or  more  effects  have  only  one 
antecedent  in  common,  that  antecedent  is  the  cause. 

Minor.  But  the  budding  of  innumerable  plants  in 
spring  has  only  one  common  antecedent — the  re- 
turn of  the  sun  to  a  higher  altitude. 

Conclusion,  this  one  antecedent  is  the  cause. 

This  is  the  method  of  agreement.  Let  us  take  a 
case  from  method  of  concomitant  variations. 

Major.  Where  an  effect  varies  with  its  supposed 
cause  this  is  the  true  cause. 

Minor.  But  the  rising  and  falling  of  the  mercury 
in  the  thermometer  varies  with  the  less  or  greater 
weight  of  the  superincumbent  atmosphere. 

Conclusion,  the  weight  of  the  atmosphere  is  there- 
fore the  cause  of  the  rise  or  fall  of  the  barometer. 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  canons,  with  their 
implied  reasoning,  do  not  guarantee  to  us  absolute 
certainty,  what  is  called  apodictic  truth  or  dem- 
onstration. None  of  these  are  certified,  as  first 
truths  are,  by  the  law  of  necessity ;  we  can  easily 
conceive  any  one  of  the  ordinary  physical  laws  not 
to  be  true  universally,  and  we  might  believe  so, 


78        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

provided  we  had  evidence.  The  evidence,  after  all, 
is  merely  a  probability  of  a  lower  or  higher  degree, 
but  may  rise  to  a  certainty  only  a  little  short  of 
being  absolute,  and  quite  sufficient  to  justify  us  to 
put  trust  in  it  and  act  upon  it  in  ordinary,  indeed 
in  all,  circumstances.  Such,  for  instance,  is  the 
proof  which  we  have  in  favor  of  the  law  of  gravita- 
tion. It  is  not  demonstrative,  like  a  mathematical 
truth,  but  it  satisfies  the  mind  and  is  verified  by 
constant  observation. 


The  Joint  Dogmatic  and  Deductive  Method.       79 


LECTURE  FOURTH. 

THE  JOINT  DOGMATIC  AND  DEDUCTIVE  METHOD.  THE 
JOINT  INDUCTIVE  AND  DEDUCTIVE.  HYPOTHESES  AND 
VERIFICATION.  CHANCE.  INDUCTION  CANNOT  GIVE 
ABSOLUTE  TRUTH.  WE  KNOW  IN  PART. 

I  HAVE  explained  the  three  ways  by  which  we 
investigate  truth  ;   the  Intuitive,  the  Deductive, 
and  the  Inductive.     I  am  now  to  join  these  three 
and  explain  the  methods  which  ensue. 

I. 

THE  JOINT  DOGMATIC  AND  DEDUCTIVE  METHOD. 

In  this  method  we  assume  a  principle  and  draw 
an  inference  from  it.  The  principle  may  be  a  self- 
evident  one,  or  it  may  be  obtained  from  a  gathered 
experience.  The  best  example  is  found  in  geom- 
etry, where,  at  the  opening,  there  are  laid  down  defi- 
nitions of  such  things  as  triangles,  circles,  squares, 
and  also  axioms  or  self-evident  truths ;  and  from 
these,  and  as  involved  in  them,  we  get  further  truths 
by  deductive  reasoning.  We  have  also  examples 
in  Formal  Logic,  as  when  the  dictum  of  Aristotle 
is  assumed,  that  whatever  is  true  of  a  class  is  true 


80         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

of  the  members  of  the  class,  and  from  this  get  the 
modes  and  figures  of  reasoning  and  innumerable 
inferences.  The  truths  thus  drawn  are  called  ap- 
podictic  by  Aristotle,  and  demonstrative  by  the 
moderns.  Or  the  assumed  principle  may  be  ob- 
tained from  a  collected  induction,  such  as  the  law 
of  light  that  the  angle  of  reflection  is  equal  to  the 
angle  of  incidence,  from  which  may  be  drawn  a  large 
body  of  conclusions. 

This  method  has  often  been  applied  illegiti- 
mately, that  is,  to  departments  which  have  to  deal 
with  scattered  facts.  In  the  seventeenth  century, 
when  mathematics  made  such  a  start,  there  were 
attempts  to  carry  the  geometrical  method  into  all 
branches  of  science.  It  was  used  by  Descartes  and 
his  extensively  ramified  school  in  philosophy,  and 
also  in  theology.  Assuming  the  existence  of 
thought,  of  cogito,  as  a  truth  which  cannot  be 
doubted,  he  thence  proves  his  own  existence,  which 
it  would  have  been  wise  in  him  to  assume;  and 
then,  from  the  idea  of  the  infinite  and  the  perfect 
in  the  mind,  he  argued  that  there  must  be  a  perfect 
being  existing,  whose  veracity  guarantees  our  idea 
of  matter. 

Samuel  Clarke,  finding  that  man  could  not  get 
rid  of  the  idea  of  space  and  time,  argued  that,  since 
all  things  must  either  be  substances  or  modes,  and 


The  Joint  Dogmatic  and  Deductive  Method.       81 

as  space  and  time  are  not  substances,  they  must 
be  modes  of  a  substance,  which  is  God,  whom,  by 
other  considerations,  he  clothes  with  benevolence. 
In  these  connected  systems  doubtful  definitions 
were  carried  out,  often  by  right  reasoning,  to  very 
doubtful  results. 

I  may  refer  particularly  to  the  wrong  applica- 
tion which  was  made  of  this  method  by  Spinoza, 
the  Dutch  Jew  designated  expressively  by  Du- 
gald  Stewart  "  the  thought-bewildered  man."  In 
his  Ethics,  beginning  with  a  formidable  array  of 
definitions,  axioms,  postulates,  and  corollaries,  he 
draws  out  a  philosophical  religious  system  in  which 
God  is  at  once  extension  and  thought,  and  being 
THE  ALL  is  the  moral  evil  in  the  world  as  well  as 
the  good  ;  is,  in  fact,  the  deceit,  the  hypocrisy,  the 
adultery,  as  well  as  the  true,  the  upright,  the  holy. 
A  number  of  powerful  German  thinkers,  metaphy- 
sicians, and  theologians,  toward  the  end  of  last 
century,  became  greatly  enamored  with  the  panthe- 
ism of  Spinoza,  and  several  of  them  drew  out  sys- 
tems of  much  the  same  kind.  All  agreed  in  pro- 
ceeding a  priori  in  deducing  results  from  favorite 
principles.  They  all  drew  much  from,  indeed,  pro- 
ceeded upon,  favorite  fundamental  principles,  and 
drew  out  imposing  systems  all  more  or  less  idealistic 

and  pantheistic.  The  ablest  of  the  speculators  were 
6 


82          The  Tests  of  The  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

Fichte,  Schelling,  culminating,  and,  it  is  to  be  hoped, 
terminating,  in  Hegel.  They  have  been  followed 
by  several  dozen  others,  such  as  Herbart,  Lotze, 
and,  we  may  add,  Schopenhauer  and  Von  Hartmann, 
all  of  whom  adopt  some  new  principle  and  carry  it 
out  in  the  same  way.  The  newest  form  is  Neo-Kant- 
ism,  which,  however,  can  never  reach  the  truth  till 
it  abandon  certain  fundamental  principles  of  Kant, 
such  as  that  we  perceive  mere  phenomena  in  the 
sense  of  appearances,  instead  of  things  ;  and  that  the 
mind  adds  forms  to  things  when  it  perceives  them. 
These  systems  have  had  their  day,  which,  it  is 
hoped,  is  now  coming  to  a  close.  It  is  hoped  that 
they  will  never  become  the  prevailing  philosophies 
in  England,  France,  and  America.  In  Germany 
they  have  buried  beneath  them  some  of  the  simple 
truths  of  Scripture  and  natural  piety.  The  funda- 
mental objection  to  the  method  is  that  it  is  not 
applicable  to  the  sciences,  which  have  to  deal  with 
facts.  The  method  is  a  powerful  one  when  we  have 
the  legitimate  means  of  using  it,  that  is,  self-evident 
truth.  But  it  is  not  available  when  we  have  to  observe 
and  co-ordinate  the  facts  of  nature  within  and  with- 
out us.  Our  philosophic  physicists  are  quite  aware 
of  this.  Our  metaphysicians  should  acknowledge 
the  same  truth.  "  A  clever  man,"  says  Herschel, 
"  shut  up  alone  and  allowed  unlimited  time,  might 


The  Joint  Inductive  and  Deductive  Method.       83 

reason  out  for  himself  all  the  truths  of  mathematics 
by  proceeding  from  those  simple  notions  of  space 
and  number  of  which  he  cannot  divest  himself 
without  ceasing  to  think.  But  he  could  never  tell, 
by  any  effort  of  reasoning,  what  would  become  of  a 
lump  of  sugar  if  immersed  in  water,  or  what  im- 
pression would  be  left  on  his  eye  by  mixing  the 
colors  of  yellow  and  blue."  (Natural  Philosophy,  67.) 

II. 

THE  JOINT  INDUCTIVE  AND  DEDUCTIVE 
METHOD. 

J.  S.  Mill  argues  that  more  progress  will  now  be 
made,  even  in  observational  sciences,  by  deduction 
than  by  induction.  This  may  be  doubted.  It  seems 
to  me  that  observation  and  experiment  must  always 
be  the  surest  way  of  advancing  research.  But  deduc- 
tion may  be  joined  to  induction.  When  this  is  done 
the  method  may  be  called  the  Joint  Inductive  and 
Deductive.  This  is,  in  fact,  the  method  represented 
by  Mr.  Mill  as  conducting  to  such  fruitful  results. 

In  this  method  the  inquirer  begins  in  the  induct- 
ive method  ;  that  is,  he  observes  facts  with  care  and 
with  the  view  of  discovering  a  law.  As  he  pro- 
ceeds he  will  ever  be  asking  \vhether  the  law  is  so 
and  so  ;  that  is,  devising  an  hypothesis.  In  order 
to  determine  whether  this  is  a  true  law  of  nature 


84          The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truths. 

he  has  to  examine  further  facts ;  it  may  be,  facts  of 
a  different  kind.  As  he  acts  thus  he  may  find  he 
can  apply  deduction.  He  inquires  what  effects 
follow  from  the  law  in  his  mind,  and  he  then  com- 
pares these  with  the  facts.  If  he  finds  these  to 
correspond  he  has  a  verification  of  his  hypothesis. 
It  is  by  combining  the  two  in  this  way  that  the 
greater  number  of  the  established  laws  of  nature 
have  been  discovered.  In  most  cases  there  have 
been  long  processes,  both  of  induction  and  deduc- 
tion, before  the  law  has  been  ascertained  and  ad- 
justed. When  the  laws  of  nature  are  quantitative, 
as  they  commonly  are,  mathematics  may  be  applied 
to  them,  and  it  becomes  the  instrument  of  the  de- 
duction ;  and  often  a  far-reaching  one — showing 
very  distant  consequences  which  can  be  compared 
with  facts. 

In  the  sciences  of  observation  sometimes  the  in- 
ductive element  and  sometimes  the  deductive 
method  is  the  more  prominent ;  in  all  cases  the  in- 
ductive, as  I  reckon,  is  the  essential.  In  Galileo's 
researches  experiment  was  the  main  instrument, 
but  he  also  used  mathematics.  Kepler's  fertile 
mind  was  always  devising  hypotheses,  but  he  ac- 
cepted them  only  as  they  were  confirmed  by  obser- 
vations. It  would  be  wrong  to  say  that  Newton's 
method  was  mere  induction.  He  had  before  him 


The  Joint  Inductive  and  Deductive  Method.        85 

the  observations  of  Galileo  and  Kepler,  and  also  a 
measurement  of  the  distance  of  the  earth's  surface 
from  the  center,  and  he  applied  a  powerful  mathe- 
matics, created  by  himself,  to  these  facts.  It  is  a 
circumstance  greatly  to  his  credit  that  when,  hav- 
ing a  wrong  measurement  of  the  distance  of  the 
earth's  circumference  from  its  center,  he  found  his 
theory,  that  the  moon  was  held  in  her  sphere  by  the 
same  power  as  draws  an  apple  to  the  ground,  not 
to  be  in  accordance  with  facts  he  gave  it  up  for  a  time, 
and  only  resumed  it  when  it  was  found,  on  the 
proper  distance  of  the  earth's  surface  being  ascer- 
tained, that  the  facts  corresponded.  In  all  depart- 
ments of  physics  or  natural  philosophy  the  deduct- 
ive mingles  with  the  inductive.  In  optics,  in 
thermotics,  in  theoretical  astronomy,  in  mechanics, 
the  deductive  or  mathematical  element  has  a  con- 
spicuous place  ;  but  in  all  these  sciences  we  have 
always  to  start  with  observed  facts.  In  ethics  we 
carry  out  indefinitely  the  laws  of  our  moral  nat- 
ure; but  these  have  been  ascertained  by  a  previous 
observation  of  that  nature.  In  like  manner,  in 
logic  we  deduce  consequences  from  the  laws  of 
discursive  thought,  which  we  have  found  by  ob- 
serving how  they  act  in  the  mind.  In  all  the  social 
sciences  there  is  a  mixture  of  the  two  elements, 
sometimes  one  and  sometimes  the  other  being 


86          The  Tests  of  The  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

predominant.  Jurisprudence  is  forever  appealing 
to  fundamental  principles,  and  inquiring  how  they 
apply  to  a  given  case.  The  science  of  national 
wealth  must  be  constructed  mainly  by  the  observa- 
tion and  collection  of  facts  in  statistical  and  other 
forms;  but  there  are  universally  operating  prin- 
ciples ever  called  in.  Thus  it  is  supposed  that  men 
are  usually  swayed  by  a  desire  to  promote  their  in- 
terest so  far  as  they  know  it.  This  is  certainly  a 
powerful  motive.  But  there  are  others,  such  as  the 
desire  for  fame,  for  power,  for  society,  for  the  beau- 
tiful, for  promoting  education  and  religion,  all 
actuating  individuals,  and  the  influence  may  be 
traced  in  the  progress  of  nations.  In  chemistry  the 
laws  have  to  be  ascertained  by  observation,  partic- 
ularly by  experiment;  but  when  principles  have 
been  discovered,  such  as  that  of  affinity,  they  may 
be  carried  out  indefinitely.  Psychology,  as  a  science, 
is  constructed  mainly  by  the  observations  of  con- 
sciousness ;  but,  having  ascertained  certain  laws, 
such  as  those  of  the  association  of  ideas,  we  can  ex- 
plain how  they  affect  our  beliefs  and  feelings.  In 
pedagogics,  or  the  science  of  teaching,  we  must 
carefully  observe  the  ways  of  children  ;  but  in  doing 
so  we  discover  their  actuating  motives,  such  as  the 
love  of  knowledge,  the  love  of  play,  the  love  of  ap- 
probation, which  have  to  be  taken  into  account  in 


The  Joint  Inductive  and  Deductive  Method.        87 

constructing  our  methods  of  instruction  and  dis- 
cipline. In  aesthetics  there  are  ascertained  laws  of 
taste  which  must  be  taken  along  with  us  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  science.  In  all  departments  of 
natural  history  observation  must  play  the  most  im- 
portant part,  but  there  are  laws  of  life  and  of  form 
to  guide  biologists  in  all  their  investigations. 

The  principles  from  which  we  deduce  conclusions 
are  of  two  kinds.  Some  are  self-evident  or  demon- 
strative. Such  are  moral  laws  and  maxims.  These 
are  assumed,  and  are  applied  extensively  and  con- 
stantly in  history  and  in  all  the  social  sciences ;  in 
all  sciences  which  deal  with  motives  and  character. 
Of  this  description  is  the  maxim  that  men  are  likely 
to  be  happy  and  comfortable  when  they  are  moral. 
To  this  same  class  belong  all  mathematical  propo- 
sitions founded  on  axioms.  These  self-evident 
truths  are  seldom  formally  enunciated ;  they  are 
simply  assumed  and  applied.  So  far  as  science 
uses  them  it  is  very  much  employing  the  Joint  Dog- 
matic and  Deductive  Method.  But  there  is  a  second 
kind  of  principles  used  in  deduction  even  more  ex- 
tensively ;  these  are  acknowledged  truths  and  wise 
laws  established  by  a  large  induction.  For  ex- 
ample, any  one  may  now  assume  the  law  of  gravi- 
tation. In  optics  it  is  allowed  that  the  angle  of 
reflection  is  equal  to  the  angle  of  incidence,  and 


88          The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truths. 

from  this  a  great  many  particular  truths  may  be 
drawn.  In  chemistry  it  is  taken  for  granted  that 
the  elements  combine  in  certain  proportions,  and 
from  this  a  multitude  of  consequences  follow. 

In  this  joint  method  the  induction  is  tested  by 
the  canons  of  induction  and  the  deduction  by  the 
rules  of  reasoning. 

III. 

HYPOTHESES  AND  VERIFICATION.    CONSILIENCE 
OF  INDUCTIONS. 

"  Hypotheses  non  fingo"  said  Newton,  meaning, 
perhaps,  that  he  introduced  no  fictitious  agency, 
but  merely  vercz  causa,  such  as  existed  in  nature ; 
or,  more  probably,  that  he  accepted  no  truth  till  it 
was  established.  Since  Newton's  time,  especially 
within  the  last  age,  hypotheses  have  played  a  very 
important  part  in  all  departments  in  which  the  laws 
have  not  been  settled,  as,  for  example,  in  electricity 
and  biology.  The  investigator  is  bent  on  knowing 
what  laws  certain  phenomena  follow.  But  in  nature 
divers  agents  are  mixed  up  with  one  another,  and 
we  cannot  determine  what  they  are  by  a  loose  in- 
spection. As  he  observes  tentatively,  he  makes  a 
supposition  suggested  by  the  facts  as  to  what  the 
law  should  be.  When  he  notices  the  descent  of 
plants  and  animals  he  says  to  himself,  Let  us  sup- 


Hypotheses  and  Verification.  89 

pose  the  law  to  be  that  of  development  or  heredity. 
He  has  now  a  specific  end  to  work  for,  and  he  ob- 
serves and  collects  facts,  and  inquires  whether  they 
agree  with  the  hypothesis  he  has  formed.  If  he 
finds  that  many  of  them  do  so  he  has  a  probability, 
and  is  encouraged  to  proceed  ;  and  if  the  hypothe- 
sis explains  a  large  body  of  events  it  rises  to  the 
rank  of  a  theory.  When  it  takes  in  all  the  facts 
bearing  on  the  particular  case,  and  no  exceptions 
can  be  discovered,  it  is  regarded  as  a  law  of  nature, 
which,  however,  may  require  to  be  modified  and 
adjusted  before  it  suits  all  the  facts,  and  so  be- 
comes the  true  law.  This  process  is  called 

The  Verification  of  Hypotheses. — When  first  sug- 
gested the  supposition  may  have  little  to  support 
it,  and  there  may  seem  to  be  facts  opposed  to  it. 
But  if  it  is  the  correct  one  there  will  come  confir- 
mations from  a  variety  of  quarters,  difficulties  will 
disappear,  and  the  seeming  exceptions  may  corrob- 
orate it.  The  hypothesis  started  is  that  light  con- 
sists in  vibrations,  not  a  very  probable  supposition 
beforehand,  but  tken  it  is  found  to  explain  one  set 
of  phenomena  after  another,  till  at  last  it  seems  to 
account  for  every  thing,  and  is  counted  as  an  es- 
tablished law.  Or  the  hypotheses  is  that  of  the 
conservation  of  energy,  or  that  the  amount  of 
energy  in  the  world,  real  and  potential,  cannot 


90         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truths. 

be  increased  or  diminished.  On  the  first  con- 
sideration of  this  view  obvious  objections  will 
present  themselves.  We  strike  with  a  hammer 
upon  a  piece  of  iron  till  our  strength  is  exhausted, 
and  it  looks  as  if  force  had  been  expended  and  lost. 
But,  on  further  inquiry,  we  detect  the  energy  that 
had  gone  out  of  the  body  to  be  conserved  in  the 
molecular  motion  or  heat  of  the  metal. 

Hypotheses,  I  rather  think,  must  be  resorted  to 
in  the  early  stages  of  the  investigation  of  every  sort 
of  phenomena.  They  are  simply  tentatives,  and 
most  of  them  may  have  to  be  abandoned.  They 
may  or  they  may  not  be  announced ;  they  may  in 
the  first  instance  be  simply  guesses,  and  only  a 
few  or  one  of  them  prosecuted  to  any  great  extent. 
The  law  of  gravitation  was,  for  a  time,  only  an  hy- 
pothesis, taking  the  erroneous  form  that  matter 
attracts  other  matter,  not  according  to  the  square  of 
the  distance,  which  is  the  true  law,  but  according  to 
the  distance.  Hypotheses  are  necessary,  but  are 
to  be  carefully  watched  and  limited. 

First. — The  hypothesis  must  be  suggested  by  the 
facts  and  not  be  feigned  by  the  mind  ;  this  may  be 
the  meaning  of  Newton's  statement. 

Second. — It  must  be  regarded  as  a  mere  hypothe- 
sis till  it  is  established  by  the  criteria  applicable  to 
the  department.  We  are  much  troubled  in  the 


Hypotheses  and  Verification.  91 

present  day  by  hypotheses  being  represented  as 
established  laws. 

Third. — The  hypothesis  is  to  be  abandoned  when 
it  is  found  that  there  are  facts  inconsistent  with  it. 
It  requires  much  courage  to  abandon  an  hypothesis 
which  has  long  been  cherished,  and,  perhaps,  pub- 
lished to  the  \vorld. 

Fourth. — It  is  established  as  a  law  when  it  ex- 
plains all  the  phenomena  bearing  on  the  subject 
and  is  not  contradicted  by  any  known  fact. 

It  is  a  powerful  confirmation  of  an  hypothesis 
when  it  enables  us  to  predict  occurrences.  If  the 
alleged  law  be  the  true  one  the  facts  will  correspond 
to  it  in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  and  as  they  fall 
out  will  tend  to  prove  that  the  hypothesis  is  a 
sound  one.  Dr.  Whewell  has  shown  that  the  evi- 
dence in  favor  of  our  induction  is  of  a  much  higher 
and  more  forcible  character  when  it  enables  us  to 
explain  and  determine  cases  of  a  kind  different 
from  those  which  were  contemplated  in  the  forma- 
tion of  our  hypothesis.  "  Thus  it  was  found  by 
Newton  that  the  doctrine  of  the  attraction  of  the 
sun  varying  according  to  the  inverse  square  of  the 
distance,  which  explained  Kepler's  third  law,  of  the 
proportionality  of  the  cubes  of  the  distances  to  the 
squares  of  the  periodic  times  of  the  planets,  ex- 
plained, also,  his  first  and  second  laws,  of  the  ellip- 


92         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

tical  motion  of  each  planet,  although  no  connection 
of  these  laws  had  been  visible  before.  Again,  it 
appeared  that  the  force  of  universal  gravitation, 
which  had  been  inferred  from  the  perturbations  of 
the  moon  and  planets  by  the  sun  and  by  each 
other,  also  accounted  for  the  fact,  apparently  alto- 
gether dissimilar  and  remote,  of  the  precession  of 
the  equinoxes."  He  designates  this  process  as  the 
Consilience  of  Inductions.  He  declares:  "  No  ex- 
ample can  be  pointed  out  in  the  whole  history  of 
science,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  in  which  this  consili- 
ence of  inductions  has  given  testimony  in  favor  of 
an  hypothesis  afterward  discovered  to  be  false." 

IV. 

CHANCE. 

In  one  sense  there  is  and  can  be  no  such  thing  as 
chance  ;  that  is,  an  event  without  a  cause  or  without  a 
purpose.  Every  occurrence  has  a  cause  in  God.  Not 
only  so,  but  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  this  world  it 
has  a  mundane  cause.  Further,  it  falls  out  accord- 
ing to  the  uniformity  of  nature. 

But  there  are  senses  in  which  there  is  chance  in 
our  world.  The  oldest  definition  of  chance  (TV%Q) 
was  by  Anaxagoras,  who  makes  it  an  event  whose 
cause  cannot  be  discerned  by  human  reason 
This  account  needs  only  to  be  a  little 


Chance.  93 

expanded  and  made  more  definite.  There  are  oc- 
currences of  which  the  cause  or  the  law  is  unknown, 
and,  in  consequence,  we  cannot  anticipate  their  oc- 
currence. This  may  arise  from  the  cause  being 
utterly  unknown  to  us.  More  frequently  it  arises 
from  the  complexity  of  nature,  from  there  being  a 
number  of  agents  working,  or  from  the  nature  of 
their  operation.  We  may  know  all  the  agencies  at 
work,  but  we  cannot  tell  how  they  are  working.  In 
all  cases  the  events  do  not  recur  with  such  regu- 
larity as  to  constitute  a  law.  There  wa's  a  time 
when  eclipses  were  regarded  as  coming  according 
to  no  law,  and  men,  following  the  law  of  causality, 
referred  them  to  a  deity.  When  these  causes  were 
discovered  they  were  found  to  have  periods,  and 
astronomers  could  predict  their  recurrence,  and 
they  were  viewed  in  a  different  light.  Till  lately 
meteors  were  supposed  to  appear  capriciously,  but 
now  showers  of  them  are  expected  at  certain  sea- 
sons of  the  year,  and  nobody  ascribes  them  to 
chance.  When  we  shake  a  die  in  a  dice-box  we 
are  acquainted  with  the  mechanical  law  which  it 
obeys  in  its  movements,  but  we  cannot  say  which 
side  will  cast  up.  We  know,  in  a  general  way, 
what  physiological  agencies  produce  death,  but  we 
cannot  predict  at  what  precise  time  any  man 
will  die. 


94        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

Still,  even  in  such  cases,  a  certain  kind  and 
amount  of  truth  may  be  had,  and  this  from  the 
circumstance  that  the  event  proceeds,  after  all, 
from  causes  which  operate  regularly,  and  from  there 
being  a  limited  number  of  causes.  We  find  that, 
given  a  sufficient  number  of  trials,  each  side  of  the 
die  will  come  up  the  same  number  of  times ;  if  any 
side  comes  up  more  frequently  than  another  we 
argue  that  the  dice  have  been  loaded.  We  do  not 
know  when  any  one  man  will  die,  but  we  can  ascer- 
tain what  number  of  people  will  die  in  a  given  time 
in  a  community. 

In  such  cases  we  can  strike  an  average,  and  we 
can  foretell  average  results  and  estimate  the  prob- 
ability of  a  given  event.  When  we  speak  of  the 
probability  of  an  occurrence  we  are  not  to  under- 
stand this  as  implying  the  uncertainty  of  the  occur- 
rence considered  in  itself.  The  event,  say  the 
death  of  a  person  on  a  certain  day,  may  be  abso- 
lutely sure,  owing  to  causes  operating.  We  can 
conceive  that  there  are  higher  intelligences  to 
whom  it  would  not  be  uncertain.  We  are  sure  that 
it  would  not  be  so  to  the  view  of  the  Omniscient. 
It  is  so  to  us  because  of  the  limited  nature  of  our 
faculties  and  of  our  knowledge  of  the  causes  oper- 
ating. Were  we  cognizant  of  all  the  antecedent 
circumstances  we  might,  in  many  cases,  be  able  to 


Chance.  95 

predict  the  result.  It  is  because  of  our  ignorance 
that  the  event  is  uncertain  to  us.  The  probability 
or  improbability  is  not  in  the  event,  but  in  the 
grounds  which  we  have  for  expecting  it ;  it  is  sub- 
jective and  not  objective. 

In  all  cases  we  must  have  certain  data,  gained  by 
observation  and  yielding  a  general  average.  In 
some  departments  we  can  express  numerically  the 
probability  or  improbability  of  the  particular  oc- 
currence. An  event  reckoned  impossible  may  be 
represented  by  o;  an  event  certain  to  happen,  by  I. 
All  degrees  of  probability  may  be  denoted  by  the 
fractions  representing  value  from  zero  to  one.  The 
probability  of  an  uncertain  event  is  represented 
by  the  number  of  chances  favorable  and  unfavor- 
able. Thus  the  casting  up  of  ahead  or  a  tail  being 
I,  and  the  chances  against  it  being  2,  the  proper 
chance  is  one  half.  The  tables  that  have  been  pre- 
pared for  life  insurance  companies  have  been  very 
elaborate,  but  need  not  here  be  given. 

There  is  another  sense  in  which  it  may  be  said 
that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  chance.  There  cannot 
be  an  occurrence  without  a  purpose  on  the  part  of 
God,  who  has  ordered  the  causes  producing  it.  But 
there  may  be  a  concurrence  without  a  design.  It 
is  by  chance  that  certain  rocks  take  the  form  of  the 
face  of  Napoleon  or  Wellington.  I  do  not  know 


96         The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

that  there  was  any  purpose  designed  or  effected  by 
so  many  men  of  genius  being  born  in  the  year  1/69, 
or  by  Cervantes  dying  on  the  same  day  as  Shake- 
speare died.  There  are  certain  minds  that  take 
the  keenest  interest  in  observing  such  coincidences, 
and  discover  a  deep  meaning  in  what  is  in  itself 
meaningless ;  for  example,  connecting  a  calamity 
with  the  spilling  of  salt  at  a  table,  or  from  thirteen 
persons  meeting  at  that  table.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  there  is  an  immense  congregation  of  agents 
that  are  independent,  to  produce  an  evident  benev- 
olent end — for  instance,  of  vibrations  of  light,  of 
coats  and  humors,  of  rods  and  cones,  to  enable  us 
to  see  through  the  eye — there  is  evidence  of  design, 
the  chances  being  all  against  such  a  concurrence. 

V. 

NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  conduct  this  science 
on  the  joint  dogmatic  and  deductive  method,  but, 
in  my  opinion,  without  much  success.  It  has  to 
deal  with  facts — the  existence  of  God,  and  the  im- 
mortality of  the  individual  soul — and,  therefore, 
must  have  an  inductive  or  observational  element.  I 
have  my  doubts  whether,  from  a  mere  idea  or  prin- 
ciple in  the  mind,  we  can  argue  the  existence  of  the 
living  God.  It  should  proceed,  I  reckon,  mainly  in 


Natural  Theology.  97 

the  joint  inductive  and  deductive  method.  It  looks 
at  God's  works  within  and  without  us,  and,  discover- 
ing wonderful  mutual  fittings,  means  and  end,  traces 
of  love  and  just  government,  it  rises  to  the  belief  in 
a  being  of  power,  wisdom,  benevolence,  and  justice. 
The  inductions  are  collected  in  such  works  as  Ray's 
Wisdom  of  God,  in  Paley's  Natural  Tkeology,  in  the 
Rridgewater  Treatises,  and  the  ordinary  works  of 
natural  religion. 

But  there  are  deductive  processes  involved.  The 
premises  here  are  supplied  mainly  by  a  priori  prin- 
ciples or  by  intuition,  all  to  be  justified  by  the  cri- 
teria of  First  Truths.  In  the  mind  of  man  there  are 
high  and  deep  truths  in  the  germ,  all  capable  of 
being  developed  and  actually  working  in  the  mature 
man,  being  called  forth  by  the  circumstances  in 
which  he  is  placed.  There  is  the  principle  of 
causation,  requiring  us,  on  a  new  thing  or  a  change 
appearing,  to  seek  for  a  cause.  This  can  stand  the 
tests  of  intuition,  being  self-evident,  necessary,  uni- 
versal, in  our  very  nature  and  constitution  ;  and  it 
leads  us  to  believe  that  where  there  are  traces  of 
design  there  must  be  a  designer.  There  is  a  moral 
power  within  us,  with  its  law  and  its  obligations, 
implying  a  law-giver.  We  have  not  an  adequate 
idea  of  infinity,  but  we  believe  that  there  is  some- 
thing beyond  our  widest  idea  or  concept,  something 


98       The  Tests  of  the   Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

to  which  nothing  can  be  added,  and  we  are  led  to 
apply  it  to  the  powerful,  the  good  and  holy  One. 

We  are  entitled,  we  are  required,  to  trust  and 
follow  these  principles.  They  are  elements,  and  the 
highest  elements^  of  the  reason  with  which  we  are 
endowed.  We  begin  with  trusting  the  senses,  and 
find,  as  we  do  so,  constant  confirmations  in  our  daily 
experience ;  what  appeared  at  first  to  be  realities 
we  discover  to  be  more  real  as  we  bring  one  sense 
after  another  to  bear  upon  them,  and  find  that  meat 
nourishes  us  and  pure  air  refreshes  us,  and  the  due 
use  of  the  good  things  of  this  world  prolongs  life. 
We  should  confide  in  the  same  way  in  our  higher 
ideas  and  beliefs,  and  as  we  do  so  we  find  them  ex- 
panding and  elevating  the  mind,  opening  grand 
vistas  which  look  beyond  the  seen  and  temporal 
into  the  unseen  and  eternal.  If  we  do  not  follow 
our  lower  instincts,  if  we  do  not  eat  and  drink,  our 
bodies  will  become  feeble  and  die  ;  and  if  we  deny 
our  higher  reason  our  souls  will  lose  their  freshness, 
vigor,  and  aspirations. 

But  when  we  would  construct  the  argument, 
indeed,  in  all  scientific  investigations  and  in  all  true 
philosophy,  we  must  be  careful  to  ascertain  the 
exact  nature  of  the  intuitions  or  intuitive  reason  we 
call  in,  and  only  use  them  accordingly.  Those  who 
neglect  this  are  sure  to  present  them  in  an  extrav- 


Natural  Theology.  99 

agant  form  or  make  a  perverted  use  of  them.  This 
has  been  done  by  the  mystics  of  the  East  and  of 
mediaeval  times,  indeed,  of  all  ages.  Almost  always 
they  have  got  a  glimpse  of  a  reality,  but  they  have 
seen  it  only  under  partial  aspects,  and  they  have 
shown  it  to  us  through  a  cloud,  or  irradiated  it  with 
reflected  light,  and  have  represented  it  to  us  as 
vision,  inspiration,  and  ecstasy,  whereas  it  is  only 
one  of  the  higher  elevations  of  our  nature. 

All  our  profound  thinkers  have  seen  these  truths, 
but  have  not  always  properly  represented  them.  We 
may  hold  with  Plato  that  there  is  a  grand,  indeed, 
a  divine,  Idea  ;  but  I  wish  that  idea,  as  in  the  mind, 
carefully  examined  and  its  forms  or  law  exactly  de- 
termined, and  it  is  for  inductive  science,  and  not 
speculation,  to  tell  us  what  are  the  types  which 
represent  it  in  nature.  I  hold  with  Aristotle  that 
there  are  formal  and  final,  as  well  as  material  and 
efficient,  causes  in  nature  ;  but  it  is  for  a  careful  in- 
duction to  determine  the  nature  of  these  and  to 
show  how  matter  and  force  are  made  to  work  for 
order  and  for  ends.  I  am  as  sure  as  Descartes,  and 
as  Augustine  and  Anselm  were  before  him,  that 
there  is  in  the  mind  a  germ  of  the  idea  of  the  in- 
finite and  perfect;  but  we  must  show  what  is  the 
precise  nature  of  the  idea,  so  as  to  secure  that  we 
draw  only  legitimate  inferences  from  it.  I  discover, 


100      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

as  Leibnitz  did,  a  pre-established  harmony  in  nature, 
but  it  consists  mainly,  not  in  things  acting  inde- 
pendently of  each  other,  but  in  the  harmony  pro- 
duced by  things  acting  on  each  other.  I  attach  as 
much  importance  to  experience  as  Locke  did,  but  I 
maintain  that  observation  discovers  that  the  intu- 
ition (which  he  acknowledged)  looks  at  principles 
in  the  mind  prior  to  all  experience.  I  allow  to  Kant 
his  forms,  his  categories,  and  his  ideas,  but  their 
nature  is  to  be  discovered,  not  by  criticism,  but  by 
induction,  when  they  will  be  found  not  to  superin- 
duce qualities  on  things,  but  simply  to  enable  us  to 
perceive  what  is  in  things.  I  believe  with  Schelling 
in  intuition  (Anschauung),  but  it  is  an  intuition 
viewing  realities.  I  hold  with  Hegel  that  there  is 
an  Absolute  ;  but  I  believe  that  our  knowledge, 
after  all,  is  finite,  implying  an  infinite,  and  that  the 
doctrine  can  be  enunciated  so  as  not  to  issue  in  pan- 
theism. I  turn  away  with  scornful  aversion  from 
the  pessimism  of  Schopenhauer  and  Von  Hartmann, 
but  I  believe  they  have  done  good  by  calling  at- 
tention to  the  existence  of  evil,  to  remove  which  is 
an  end  worthy  of  the  labors  and  suffering  of  the 
Son  of  God.  I  believe,  with  Herbert  Spencer,  in  a 
vast  unknown  above,  beneath,  and  around  us ;  but 
I  rejoice  in  a  light  shining  in  the  darkness  and  re- 
vealing the  known.  I  believe  in  the  gems  so  rich 


Limits  to  Human  Knowledge.  101 

and  varied  which  the  higher  poets  have  left  us  as  a 
rich  inheritance  ;  but  before  they  can  enter  into 
philosophy  they  must  be  cut  and  set,  and  it  will  re- 
quire a  skillful  hand  to  adjust  them,  and  when  they 
are  cut  it  must  be  as  skillfully  as  diamonds  are,  and 
this  only  to  show  more  fully  their  form  and  beauty. 

VI. 
LIMITS  TO  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 

The  aim  of  this  treatise  has  been  to  show  that  the 
human  mind  is  capable  of  reaching  knowledge,  and 
that  it  has  tests  to  determine  when  it  has  done  so. 
I  have  faced  the  agnostic,  but  have  not  entered  into 
a  wrestling  with  him,  which  would  be  endless, 
because  he  refuses  to  take  a  form  by  which  I  may 
lay  hold  of  him.  I  have  pursued  a  more  effectual 
method.  I  have  shown  objects  where  he  assures  us 
that  there  is  nothing.  It  is  in  this  way  we  can  com- 
mand assent  and  gain  assurance. 

I  have  proceeded  on  the  idea  that  there  is  a  dif- 
ference in  the  certitude  of  truths.  Some  I  have 
shown  are  self-evident,  necessary,  and  universally 
held,  and  therefore  certain  beyond  doubt  or  dispute; 
others  are  only  probable,  some  with  only  a  slight 
balance  in  their  favor,  others  rising  to  certainty. 
This  is  not  so  much  a  difference  in  the  truths  as  a 
difference  in  the  evidence  to  us.  To  God  and  to 


102       The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

higher  beings,  the  one  kind  may  be  as  certain  as  the 
other.  We  cannot  tell  whether  there  will  or  will 
not  be  a  good  harvest  next  year.  But  to  Omniscience 
it  may  be  as  certain  that  there  is  to  be  a  good 
harvest  as  that  all  the  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal 
to  two  right  angles.  It  is  of  vast  moment  that  we 
should  know  what  kind  of  evidence  we  have,  and 
what  the  validity  of  the  evidence  which  we  have  in 
favor  of  any  proposition  we  are  required  to  believe, 
whether  it  is  demonstrative  or  merely  probable,  and 
if  only  probable  what  the  degree  of  probability.  It  is 
also  of  moment  that  we  should  note  what  kind  of 
truth  admits  of  apodictic  and  what  of  only  probable 
proof.  It  is  vain  to  seek  for  demonstration  in  every 
kind  of  investigation.  We  can  have  such,  as  I 
reckon,  only  when  we  have  self-evident  truth.  But, 
then,  it  can  be  shown  that  inductive  truth  can  rise 
to  certainty.  I  doubt  much  whether  we  have  im- 
mediate evidence  of  the  existence  of  God  as  we  have 
of  the  existence  of  ourselves,  but  we  have  quite  as 
valid  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  as  we  have  of 
the  existence  of  our  fellow-men.  In  both  we  have  a 
fact,  the  acts  done,  and  we  rise  up  by  the  principle 
of  causation  to  a  cause.  The  criteria  of  truth  which 
I  have  been  furnishing  should  assist  us  in  all  such 
investigations. 

Man's  knowledge  is  increasing  and  must  continue 


Limits  to  Human  Knowledge.  103 

to  increase.  His  generalizations  widen  as  his 
knowledge  increases  and  take  in  more  and  more  ob- 
jects. He  is  constantly  gaining  more  premises  which 
lead  to  farther  conclusions.  One  discovery  leads  on 
to  another  ;  one  chamber  opened  shows  us  the  door 
which  opens  into  a  second.  Davy  proved  the  cor- 
relation of  electric  and  magnetic  forces ;  Oersted  of 
electric  and  magnetic,  and  at  last  the  grand  doctrine 
disclosed  itself  to  a  number  of  investigators,  partic- 
ularly to  Mayer,  that  all  the  physical  forces  are  cor- 
related. 

But  man's  power  of  discovering  truth  is,  and  ever 
must  be,  limited.  First,  there  are  limits  to  his 
mental  powers.  He  has  only  five  original  inlets  of 
knowledge  into  the  material  world.  Had  he  fifty 
senses  instead  of  five  he  might  know  vastly  more. 
Then,  his  power  of  working  on  the  materials  re- 
quired by  sense  and  consciousness,  his  memory  and 
his  understanding  are  also  limited.  Some  men  can 
discover  more  truth  than  others,  and  it  is  conceiv- 
able that  there  may  be  higher  intelligences  who  see 
farther  into  the  nature  of  things  than  the  most  far- 
sighted  of  men.  Secondly,  every  man's  individual 
experience  is  limited,  and  the  same  may  be  said  of 
the  experience  of  the  race — it  is  confined  within  very 
stringent  bounds. 

Man  can  discover  a  vast  amount  of  truth,  spec- 


104      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

ulative  and  practical.  We  have  enough  revealed  to 
exercise  our  faculties,  to  expand  and  elevate  the 
mind,  and  to  serve  for  all  the  purposes  of  the  duty 
we  owe  to  God,  to  ourselves,  and  our  fellow-men. 
Every  truth  known  leads  however  into  the  unknown. 
But  this  is  to  tempt  us  to  penetrate  into  the  un- 
known region  that  we  may  know  it. 

As  we  do  so  we  shall  find  that  there  are  things 
beyond  our  ken  in  a  region  beyond,  above,  or 
beneath  us,  and  we  must  be  content  to  allow  them 
to  lie  there.  We  know  as  much  as  to  know  that 
there  are  truths  which  we  cannot  know.  We  see  the 
objects  within  our  proper  range  of  vision,  but  we  also 
see  the  darkness  that  encompasses  them.  "  We  know 
in  part."  Yes,  we  know,  but  we  know  only  in  part. 

We  who  dwell  in  a  world  "  where  day  and  night 
alternate  ;"  we  who  go  every-where  accompanied  by 
our  own  shadow — a  shadow  produced  by  our  dark 
body,  but  produced  because  there  is  light — cannot 
expect  to  be  absolutely  delivered  from  the  darkness. 
Man's  faculties,  exquisitely  adapted  to  the  sphere 
in  which  he  moves,  were  never  intended  to  enable 
him  to  comprehend  all  truth.  The  mind  is  in  this 
respect  like  the  eye.  The  eye  is  so  constituted  as 
to  perceive  things  within  a  certain  range,  but  as 
objects  are  removed  farther  and  farther  from  us  they 
become  more  indistinct,  and  at  length  are  lost  sight 


Limits  to  Human  Knowledge.  105 

of  altogether.  It  is  the  same  with  the  intellect  of 
man.  It  can  penetrate  a  certain  distance  and  un- 
derstand certain  subjects,  but  as  they  stretch  away 
farther  they  look  more  and  more  confused,  and  at 
length  they  disappear  from  the  view.  And  if  the 
human  spirit  attempts  to  mount  higher  than  its 
limited  range  it  will  find  all  its  flights  fruitless. 
The  dove,  to  use  a  well-known  illustration  of  Kant's, 
may  mount  to  a  certain  height  in  the  heavens  ;  but 
as  she  rises  the  air  becomes  lighter,  and  at  length 
she  finds  that  she  can  no  longer  float  upon  its  bosom, 
and  should  she  attempt  to  soar  higher  her  pinions 
flutter  in  emptiness  and  she  falters  and  falls.  So  it 
is  with  the  spirit  of  man  :  it  can  wing  its  way  a 
very  considerable  distance  into  the  expanse  above 
it,  but  there  is  a  boundary  which  if  it  attempts  to 
pass  it  will  find  all  its  conceptions  void  and  its 
ratiocinations  unconnected. 

Placed  as  we  are  in  the  center  of  boundless  space 
and  in  the  middle  of  eternal  ages,  we  can  see  only 
a  few  objects  immediately  around  us,  and  all  others 
fade  in  outline  as  they  are  removed  from  us  by 
distance,  till  at  length  they  lie  altogether  beyond 
our  vision.  And  this  remark  holds  true  not  only  of 
the  more  ignorant,  of  those  whose  eye  can  penetrate 
the  least  distance,  it  is  true  also  of  the  learned — it 
is  perhaps  true  of  all  created  beings — that  there  is  a 


106      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

bounding  sphere  of  darkness  surrounding  the  space 
rendered  clear  by  the  torch  of  science.  Nay,  it 
almost  looks  as  if  the  wider  the  boundaries  of  science 
are  pushed,  and  the  greater  the  space  illuminated 
by  it,  the  greater  in  proportion  the  bounding  sphere 
of  darkness  into  which  no  rays  penetrate  ;  just  as  (to 
use  a  very  old  comparison)  when  we  strike  up  a 
light  in  the  midst  of  darkness,  in  very  proportion  as 
the  light  becomes  stronger  so  does  also  that  surface 
dark  and  black  which  is  rendered  visible. 


Testimony.  107 


LECTURE    FIFTH. 

TESTIMONY.    IS  IT  SUFFICIENT  TO  PROVE  THE  SUPER- 
NATURAL ? 

I. 

IT  is  not  necessary  to  suppose,  with  some  of  the 
Scottish  metaphysicians  in  their  answers  to 
Hume's  argument  against  miracles,  that  there  is  an 
original  instinct  or  principle  of  common  sense  leading 
us  to  trust  in  testimony.  I  believe,  indeed,  that 
there  is  a  social  instinct  in  all  of  us  inclining  us  to 
have  an  affection  for,  and  trust  in,  those  we  meet 
with,  especially  in  father  and  mother,  brothers  and 
sisters,  and  leading  us  to  believe  in  what  they  say. 
But  the  belief  in  testimony  is  the  result  of  experi- 
ence, and  is  modified  by  experience  ;  we  trust  in 
certain  testimonies,  but  not  in  others.  There  is  a 
conscience  in  every  man  which  disposes  him,  if  he 
does  not  resist  it,  to  speak  truly ;  even  selfishness 
prompts  him  not  to  lose  the  confidence  of  his  fel- 
low men  by  deceiving  them.  Hence  the  great 
body  of  mankind  speak  the  truth  when  they  are 
not  led  to  act  otherwise  by  a  desire  to  excuse  them- 
selves, or  by  malignity  toward  their  neighbor,  or 


108        The  Tests  of  The  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

some  other  like  motive.  We  can  reach  truth  by 
means  of  testimony.  It  was  in  his  haste  that 
David  said,  "All  men  are  liars."' 

The  testimony  of  one  man  is  often  sufficient,  be- 
cause of  his  character,  known  otherwise,  and  be- 
cause he  has  no  motive  to  deceive.  We  lay  down 
rules  for  our  guidance  in  judging  of  testimony,  as 
that  it  is  a  good  sign  if  the  statements  are  direct 
and  unartificial.  In  most  cases  we  seek  to  have  the 
testimony  of  one  man  confirmed  by  another,  that 
in  the  mouth  of  two  or  three  witnesses  every  word 
may  be  established,  it  being  shown  that  there  has 
been  no  collusion  or  conspiracy.  There  are  com- 
monly circumstances  which  corroborate  or  detract 
from  the  testimony,  Circumstantial  evidence  is  at 
times  sufficient  to  prove  that  a  prisoner  has  been 
guilty  when  there  is  no  direct  evidence  of  the  act. 
In  witness-bearing,  books  of  law  and  judges  on  the 
bench  lay  down  rules  which  may  guide  the  jury  in 
the  verdict  which  they  bring  in, 

History*—  Here  the  evidence  is  mainly  that  of 
written  testimony,  which,  however,  may  be  con- 
firmed by  original  historical  documents,  such  as 
monuments,  inscriptions,  coins,  and  ancient  charters. 
Laplace,  misled  by  a  false  analogy  derived  from  the 
diminution  of  light  when  reflected  successively  from 
a  number  of  surfaces,  declares  that  the  value  of 


Testimony.  109 

testimony  may  be  weakened  by  transmission,  and 
at  length  altogether  lost.  (Essay  on  Prob.) 
This  is  true  of  tradition,  that  is,  of  oral  testimony 
transmitted  from  mouth  to  mouth,  or  from  age  to 
age  ;  but  Sir  G.  C.  Lewis  (Meth.  of  Obs.  and  Re  as.) 
has  shown  that  "  when  the  testimony  of  the  original 
witness  has  once  been  obtained,  and  recorded  either 
by  himself  or  others  in  an  authentic  form,  it  is  per- 
petuated so  long  as  the  written  memorial  of  it  is 
preserved  in  the  original,  or  in  a  faithful  transcript, 
and  may  at  any  time  be  used  for  historical  pur- 
poses." 

I  am  to  show  that  testimony  is  fitted  to  establish 
the  occurrence  of  supernatural  as  well  as  natural 
events.  In  opening  the  subject  it  is  essential  to 
determine  what  the  natural  is,  and  what  the  super- 
natural is,  especially  in  their  relation  one  to 
another. 

II. 

THERE  is  A  NATURAL  SYSTEM.  In  seeking  to 
find  its  nature  let  us  recall  the  distinction  drawn  in 
Lecture  iii ;  the  Laws  of  Causation- and  the  Laws  of 
Uniformity.  In  the  former  there  is  power  in  the 
cause  to  produce  the  effect.  I  believe  there  is  an 
intuitive  conviction  which  perceives  this,  but  it  is 
not  necessary  to  our  present  purpose  to  insist  on 
this.  It  is  enough  that  a  long,  a  combined,  an  un- 


110      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

contradicted  experience  testifies  to  the  universality 
of  causation.  Let  it  be  observed  that  this  means 
that  every  event  has  a  cause  in  some  mundane 
agency,  such  as  gravity,  or  electricity,  or  magnetism, 
or  chemical  affinity.  I  believe  that  every  occur- 
rence has  a  cause  in  God,  but  also  that  it  proceeds 
immediately  from  a  power  imparted  to  created  ob- 
jects. God  is  the  author  of  the  seasons,  but  he  pro- 
duces them  by  the  relation  of  the  earth  and  the 
objects  on  it  to  the  sun. 

Causes  are  so  organized  that  they  lead  to  general 
results;  what  I  call  laws  of  uniformity.  The  earth 
is  so  related  to  the  moon  that  the  tides  are  pro- 
duced with  their  regular  times.  There  is  no  cau- 
sation implied  in  their  succession ;  the  incoming 
wave  does  not  produce  the  receding  wave,  nor, 
vice  versa,  does  the  retiring  wave  produce  the 
next  advancing  wave.  Many  of  these  laws  are 
simply  co-existences,  in  which  the  agents  exercise 
no  influence  on  each  other.  Even  in  cases  of  suc- 
cession the  antecedent  does  not  produce  the  con- 
sequent. Thus  day  does  not  produce  night;  both 
are  the  issue  of  causes  beyond  them.  People  often 
speak  of  a  law  necessarily  producing  an  effect  ;  this 
is  true  only  of  the  laws  of  causality. 

By  the  arrangement  of  these  causes  there  is  a 
natural  system. 


Testimony.  1 1 1 

1.  Every  substance   in  nature  is   endowed  with 
certain  properties,  original  or  derived.     Thus   the 
soul   is  possessed    of  powers   of  consciousness,  of 
sense-perception,  and  feeling.     Bodies  continue  in 
the  state  in  which  they  happen  to  be,  whether  this 
be  motion  or   rest,  unless  they  be   influenced  by 
powers  ab  extra ;  all  bodies  attract  each  other  in- 
versely according  to  the  square  of  the  distance  ;  the 
elements  combine   according    to  definite    propor- 
tions ;  light  is  propagated  by  vibrations ;  action  is 
equal  and  opposite  to  reaction  ;  in  polar  forces  like 
repels  like,  and  attracts  unlike  ;  these  are  samples 
of  properties  which  may  be  simple  or  may  be  com- 
plex,   but    are,   at   all  events,    natural   properties. 
These  properties  consist  essentially  in  tendencies;  not 
in  acts,  but  tendencies  to  act   on  the  needful  con- 
ditions being  supplied.    Thus  oxygen  has  the  tend- 
ency to  combine  with  hydrogen,  and  does  combine 
with  it,  when   the  hydrogen  is   presented   in    the 
proper  mode.     Thus  it  is  the  tendency  of  fire  to 
burn  when  fuel  is  presented,  and  the  tendency  of  a 
dead  animal  body  to  decay.     It  will  be  shown,  as 
we  advance,  that  this  tendency  is  never,  properly 
speaking,  interferred  with  in  any  of  the  miracles  of 
Scripture.     But  our  present  aim  is  simply  to  bring 
out  what  is  the  cosmical  system. 

2.  The  substances  and  their  properties  are  cor- 


112       The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

related  and  distributed  so  as  to  produce  a  general 
and  an  obvious  order.  This  is  effected  by  the  ar- 
rangement of  the  substances  with  these  properties 
so  as  to  produce  here  a  contemporaneous  order, 
and  there  a  regular  succession  of  phenomena  which 
can  be  observed  for  scientific  and  for  practical  pur- 
poses. Of  this  description  are  the  apparent  mo- 
tions of  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars  in  the  heavens, 
the  seasons  for  sowing  and  planting,  for  reaping 
and  gathering  in  fruit,  the  stages  in  the  life  of  the 
plant,  and  a  hundred  other  periodical  laws  which 
human  beings  can  observe,  more  or  less  easily,  by 
science  or  without  science,  and  to  which  they  can 
accommodate  themselves,  and,  as  they  do  so,  secure 
the  blessings  which  nature  has  provided.  All  this 
order  arises  from  arrangements  among  the  sub- 
stances with  their  powers.  With  other  distribu- 
tions and  collocations  of  natural  agents  there  might 
be  no  general  laws  or  the  general  laws  would  be  dif- 
ferent. The  actually  existing  laws  are  admirably 
adapted  to  the  constitution  of  man  ;  to  his  intellect- 
ual powers,  which  delight  to  discover  class  and 
cause,  and  the  relations  of  means  and  end,  and  also 
to  his  practical  convenience,  as  enabling  him  to  an- 
ticipate the  future  from  his  experience  of  the  past. 
It  is  very  conceivable  that  these  laws  may  be  in 
themselves  an  end  contemplated  by  God,  and 


Testimony.  113 

pleasing  to  him  as  he  surveys  them.  It  is  certain 
that  they  are  a  means  toward  a  farther  end,  a 
means  of  making  creation  intelligible  to  the  intelli- 
gent creature,  and  capable  of  being  used  for  prac- 
tical purposes. 

3.  There  is  a  large  yet  limited  body  of  objects 
and  powers,  constituting  nature  and  performing  its 
functions,  I  believe  that  the  substances,  with 
their  properties,  have  all  been  created  by  God,  and 
also  that  all  their  natural  relations  and  dispositions 
have  been  instituted  by  him.  No  human  power, 
no  natural  power,  can  add  new  substance  to  nature, 
or  destroy  any  existing  substance  ;  we  may  burn  the 
hay  or  stubble,  but  it  is  not  thereby  annihilated  ; 
one  portion  has  gone  up  into  the  air  as  smoke, 
another  has  gone  down  to  the  earth  as  ashes.  Not 
only  so,  it  seems  to  be  established  by  the  latest  sci- 
ence that  power  cannot  be  created  or  lost,  and 
that  the  sum  of  force  in  the  world  cannot  be  in- 
creased or  diminished  by  natural  means.  We  may 
transform  one  natural  force  into  another,  or  make 
"one  natural  force  produce  another  ;  but  in  all  the 
mutual  action  of  bodies  the  sum  of  the  potential 
and  actual  energies  is  never  altered.  Not  only  is 
it  beyond  created  power  to  create  or  annihilate  new 
bodies  or  substances,  it  is  beyond  all  natural  power 

to  create  or  annihilate  force.     Nature  is  a  self-com- 
8 


114      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

prised  system,  globe,  or  sphere  ;  in  se  ipso  tot  us, 
fares,  atque  rotundus. 

In  saying  so,  it  is  not  meant  to  assert  that  this 
sphere  has  no  points  of  contact  or  relationship  with 
other  compartments  of  creation,  and,  still  less,  that  it 
has  no  dependence  on  a  higher  and  a  supernatural 
power.  All  that  we  maintain  is,  that  it  has  a  num- 
ber of  agencies  which,  in  their  totality,  combination, 
and  action,  constitute  the  system  of  nature.  A 
miracle,  we  shall  see,  does  imply  the  interposition  of 
a  power  beyond  this  mundane  sphere.  It  serves  its 
end  because  it  is  the  effect  of  a  supernatural 
cause.  * 

But,  meanwhile,  let  us  understand  precisely  what 
is  meant  when  it  is  said  that  nature  is  a  self-con- 
tained system.  Let  us  not  suppose  that  it  has  been 
proven  that  it  needs  nothing  to  support  it,  and  that 
it  will  go  on  forever  if  left  to  itself.  The  geologist, 
in  his  diggings,  has  gone  a  little  beneath  the  sur- 
face, but  has  not  reached  the  bottom  in  his  ex- 
plorations ;  he  has  gone  back  many  ages,  but  has 
not  reached  the  beginning,  which  ever  retreats  from 
him.  The  astronomer  has  penetrated  to  great  dis- 
tances, but  he  has  not  reached  the  outside  ;  he  is 
just  impressed  the  more  with  the  vast  circumambient 
region  into  which  his  telescope  cannot  penetrate. 
Science  in  all  its  explorings  knows  not  when  the 


Testimony.  115 

beginning  was,  nor  when  the  end  shall  be ;  knows 
not  where  the  center  is,  nor  where  the  circumfer- 
ence is — if,  indeed,  there  be  a  circumference.  This 
knowable  world,  however  large  and  complete,  is  not, 
after  all,  the  universe,  but  only  a  part  of  it  ;  whether 
we  follow  it  behind  or  before,  above  or  beneath,  on 
the  right  side  or  the  left,  it  is  seen  to  be  broken  off; 
beginning  we  know  not  when,  ending  we  know  not 
where,  but  certainly  not  when  and  where  our  vision 
fails :  it  looks  hung  from  above,  and  resting  below, 
on  nothing  discernible  by  physical  science.  There 
is  clear  evidence  that  things  have  not  always  been 
as  they  now  are ;  there  was  a  time,  for  example, 
when  man  was  not  on  the  earth  ;  an  earlier  time 
when  there  were  no  animals  on  the  globe.  There 
is  no  evidence  that  there  are  physical  agencies 
in  the  world  which  would  keep  it  existing  forever. 
The  continental  mathematicians  of  last  century 
thought  they  had  gone  a  step  beyond  Sir  Isaac 
Newton,  and  demonstrated  that,  according  to  laws 
now  in  existence,  the  machine  would  go  on  through 
all  eternity  without  requiring  to  be  wound  up  or 
receiving  any  aid  from  without.  All  that  they 
proved  was  that  there  is  a  beautiful  self-adjusting 
or  self-regulating  arrangement  in  the  solar  system 
which  secures  that  the  obvious  variations  of  the 
motions  of  the  planetary  bodies  are  periodical. 


116        The  Tests  of  The  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

Later  inquiry  has  shown  that  there  are  agencies 
now  operating  which  must  in  the  end  dissipate  the 
whole  existing  order  of  things ;  and  the  most  ad- 
vanced science  has  discovered  no  natural  means  of 
counteracting  the  destructive  tendency.  The  fol- 
lowing are  the  conclusions  drawn  by  Professor  W. 
Thomson.  "  I.  There  is  at  present  in  the  material 
world  a  universal  tendency  to  the  dissipation  of  me- 
chanical energy.  2.  Any  restoration  of  mechanical 
energy,  without  more  than  equivalent  dissipation,  is 
impossible  in  inanimate  material  processes,  and  is 
probably  never  effected  by  means  of  organized  mat- 
ter either  endowed  with  vegetable  life  or  subjected 
to  the  will  of  an  animated  creature.  3.  Within  a 
finite  period  of  time  past  the  earth  must  have  been, 
and  within  a  finite  period  of  time  to  come  the  earth 
must  again  be,  unfit  for  the  habitation  of  man  as  at 
present  constituted,  unless  operations  have  been, 
or  are .  to  be,  performed  which  are  impossible 
under  the  laws  to  which  the  known  operations 
going  on  at  present  in  the  material  world  are 
subject."* 

All  events  happening  according  to  the  uniformity 
of  nature  can  easily  be  established  by  the  mouth 
of  two  or  three  witnesses. 

*  Transactions  of  the  Royal  Society  of  Edinburgh,  1852. 


Testimony.  117 

III. 

THERE  is  A  SUPERNATURAL  SYSTEM.  It  is  in 
the  midst  of  the  natural  system,  to  which  it  is 
adapted,  and  the  two  go  on  in  co-operation. 

It  may  be  said  to  begin  with  the  creation,  which 
is  supernatural,  and  necessarily  before  the  natural, 
which  is  its  product.  Sin  enters  into  the  govern- 
ment of  the  holy  God,  and  it  is  announced  to  the 
tempter,  Gen.  3.  15,  "  And  I  will  put  enmity  be- 
tween thee  and  the  woman,  and  between  thy  seed 
and  her  seed  ;  it  shall  bruise  thy  head,  and  thou 
shalt  bruise  his  heel."  This  is  an  epitome  of  the  his- 
tory of  the  whole  world.  There  is  a  deliverer,  who 
is  the  seed  of  the  woman,  but  with  vast  power  to 
crush  the  head  of  the  serpent,  that  is  the  evil ;  in 
short,  at  once  human  and  divine.  Henceforth  there 
is  a  struggle  and  a  contest  between  the  powers  of 
evil  and  of  good,  with  God  in  the  midst  of  it  to 
restrain  the  evil  and  secure  in  the  end  the  victory 
of  the  good.  This  is  the  present  state  of  our  world, 
as  we  see  it  all  around  us  and  feel  it  in  the  depths 
of  our  hearts. 

In  the  midst  of  the  natural  the  supernatural  has 
its  place.  As  types  reign  in  the  vegetable  and 
mineral  kingdom  so  they  also  run  through  the  king- 
dom of  grace.  There  is  the  tree  of  knowledge  of 
good  and  evil,  representing  the  contending  powers 


118        The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truths. 

in  the  world,  and  also  the  tree  of  life  for  the  heal- 
ing of  spiritual  diseases.  Enoch  is  translated  to 
keep  alive  a  belief  in  immortality.  Some  are  saved 
by  an  ark  in  the  overwhelming  deluge.  Abraham 
is  called  out  of  a  world  fast  falling  into  idolatry  to 
keep  alive  the  knowledge  of  the  truth.  There  is 
the  establishment  of  a  commonwealth  under  the 
immediate  care  of  God  ;  there  are  prophets,  speak- 
ing in  the  name  of  God,  giving  lessons  for  the  pres- 
ent and  opening  glimpses  of  the  future.  There  is  a 
captivity  in  Babylon  followed  by  a  deliverance,  and 
a  scattering  of  the  Jews  with  their  Scriptures  for  the 
wide  diffusion  of  the  Gospel.  In  the  fullness  of 
times,  in  the  middle  of  the  ages,  while  Greece  had 
furnished  its  learning  and  Rome  its  strong  domin- 
ion so  as  to  allow  the  messengers  of  the  cross 
to  spread  the  glad  tidings,  the  long-expected  One 
arrives ;  he  fulfills  his  office,  goes  about  continually 
doing  good,  he  is  persecuted  by  the  Jews,  is  in 
agony  in  the  garden,  he  is  forsaken  by  the  Father, 
and  dies  an  accursed  death,  but  before  he  expires  he 
is  able  to  say,  "  It  is  finished." 

The  death  is  followed  by  a  resurrection.  The 
work  of  the  supernatural  goes  on  but  it  is  after  a 
somewhat  different  manner.  Miracles  were  multi- 
plied while  Jesus  was  upon  the  earth  to  testify  that 
Jesus  was  above  nature  and  had  come  from  God. 


Testimony. 

There  is  no  proof  that  there  has  been  any  outward 
miracle  wrought  since  the  aspostles  died.  The 
natural,  being  the  ordinance  of  God,  takes  its  course, 
and  the  supernatural  helps  it  in  the  providential 
diffusion  of  the  Gospel,  but  it  is  chiefly  shown,  or 
rather  felt,  in  the  hearts  of  men  in  converting  and 
sanctifying  them  and  in  giving  them  peace.  That 
is  the  old  contest,  but  it  is  between  the  flesh  and 
the  spirit,  in  which  the  spirit  finally  prevails.  "  The 
Spirit  of  the  Lord  shall  be  poured  on  all  flesh." 

All  throughout  the  Scriptures  God  is  presented 
to  us  under  one  and  the  same  aspect,  as  extending 
mercy  to  sinners  through  the  sufferings  of  his  Son. 
In  the  first  promise  to  fallen  man,  the  seed  of  the 
woman,  who  was  to  put  his  heel  on  the  head  of  the 
serpent,  is  described  as  having  his  heel  bruised  as 
he  does  so.  In  the  first  worship  of  fallen  man  there 
is  the  offering  of  the  bleeding  lamb.  You  might 
have  discovered  the  wandering  path  of  the  patri- 
archs, Abraham,  Isaac,  and  Jacob  by  the  altars 
which  they  built  and  the  smoke  of  their  sacrifices 
which  they  offered.  Under  the  law  almost  all 
things  were  purified  by  blood.  The  grand  object 
presented  in  the  New  Testament  is  a  bleeding  Sav- 
iour suspended  upon  the  cross.  It  is  thus  the  same 
view  that  is  presented  to  us  under  the  patriarchal, 
the  Jewish,  and  the  Christian  dispensations.  Ex- 


120      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

cept  in  the  degree  of  development,  there  is  no  dif- 
ference between  God  as  revealed  in  Eden,  in  Sinai, 
and  on  Calvary  ;  between  God  as  described  in  the 
books  of  Moses  and  God  as  described  so  many 
centuries  later  in  the  writings  of  Paul  and  of  John. 
In  the  garden  we  have  the  law  given,  and  indi- 
cations, too,  of  One  coming  to  deliver  from  the  pen- 
alty. On  Mount  Sinai  there  is  a  law  delivered 
amid  thunderings  and  lightnings,  but  also  ordi- 
nances which  tell  of  an  atonement  for  sin.  In  the 
mysterious  transactions  on  Calvary  there  is  an  awful 
forsaking  and  a  fearful  darkness,  emblematic  of  the 
righteousness  and  indignation  of  God,  as  well  as  a 
melting  tenderness  in  the  words  of  our  Lord  breath- 
ing forgiveness  and  love,  and  telling  of  an  open 
paradise  :  "  To-day  thou  shalt  be  with  me  in  para- 
dise.'* The  first  book  of  Scripture  discloses  to  us, 
near  the  commencement,  a  worshiper  offering  a 
lamb  in  sacrifice  ;  and  the  last  shows  a  Lamb,  as  it 
had  been  slain,  in  the  midst  of  the  throne  of  God. 

IV. 

There  are-  two  systems.  Let  us  look  for  a  mo- 
ment at  each. 

The  Natural.  It  is  not  an  intuitive  truth,  it  is 
not  self-evident,  it  is  not  necessary,  it  is  not  uni- 
versal. For  a  long  period  people  did  not  believe  in 


Testimony.  121 

it.  It  has  been  established  only  within  the  last  few 
ages.  It  is  the  result  of  a  large  experience  and  has 
at  last  been  proven  by  science,  which  found  law  in 
every  department. 

Thus  natural  points  to  the  supernatural,  that  is, 
the  existence  of  God.  The  order  every-where  and 
the  adaptation  of  one  thing  to  another  are  evidence 
of  a  designing  mind.  The  invisible  things  of  God 
are  clearly  seen  from  the  things  that  are  made,  even 
his  eternal  power  and  godhead.  We  carry  this 
truth  with  us  as  an  important  factor  into  the  con- 
sideration of 

The  Supernatural.  It  is  of  importance  to  deter- 
mine precisely  what  this  is.  First,  negatively,  it  is 
not  a  violation  of  the  law  of  cause  and  effect  or  any 
intuitive  principle  in  our  nature,  such  as  I  have  ex- 
plained in  the  first  lecture  of  this  work.  Were  it 
so  it  could  not  be  proved,  could  never  have  ap- 
peared. The  supernatural  has  a  cause,  and  an  ad- 
equate cause,  in  God.  This  has  been  shown  in  two 
philosophical  works  written  by  men  not  prepos- 
sessed in  favor  of  Christianity,  by  Thomas  Brown  in 
his  work  on  Causation,  and  by  J.  S.  Mill  in  his 
Logic.  He  who  made  the  world,  as  his  works  show, 
continues  to  work  in  it,  and  may  for  wise  and  good 
reasons  change  his  mode  of  procedure. 

A  miracle  is  an  interference  with  the  law  of  cause 


122      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

and  effect  only  so  far  as  that  law  requires  a  physical 
cause  of  a  physical  event.  It  does  not  call  in  the 
physical  cause,  because  there  is  a  cause  in  the  di- 
vine power.  A  miracle  is  an  interference  with  the 
law  of  uniformity,  the  nature  which  I  have  taken 
such  pains  to  unfold  in  an  earlier  part  of  this  lect- 
ure for  the  purpose  of  enabling  me  to  explain  what 
a  miracle  is.  That  law  is  simply  the  result  of  an  ar- 
rangement of  causes  which  may  be  changed.  It  is 
not  guaranteed  by  any  intuitive  or  necessary  con- 
viction. It  is  simply  the  result  of  experience,  and 
the  experience  which  has  established  the  natural  may 
also  establish  the  supernatural.  It  is  possible,  then, 
for  a  miracle  to  take  place,  and  it  is  possible  to  es- 
tablish it  by  good  and  sufficient  evidence.  Let  us 
look  at  that  evidence. 

V. 

How  is  it,  when  an  ordinary  ghost-story  is  circu- 
lated, that  scientific  men  and  educated  men  gener- 
ally turn  away  from  it,  and  will  scarcely  be  moved 
to  inquire  into  it  ?  Because  the  story  is  contrary  to 
the  whole  analogy  of  the  system  of  nature,  and  is  of 
a  class  which  is  believed  in  only  by  the  weak  and 
superstitious,  little  disposed  or  capacitated  to  inves- 
tigate evidence.  But  why  do  we  not  turn  away  in 
the  same  manner  from  the  stories  recorded  in  the 


Testimony.  123 

life  of  Jesus  ?  This  is,  in  fact,  the  whole  argument 
pressed  upon  the  world  an  age  ago  in  the  Essays 
and  Reviews,  and  propagated  by  the  Arnold  family, 
especially  in  their  novel.  The  question  can  be  an- 
swered. There  is  a  vast  difference  between  the  two 
cases.  The  ghost-stories  are  totally  unlike  the  nar- 
ratives of  our  Lord's  miracles.  The  ghost  tales  are 
seldom  authenticated  to  us  by  clear-headed  and 
competent  witnesses.  When  they  and  the  like  fab- 
ulous stones  are  investigated  by  competent  men  on 
scientific  principles  the  evidence  is  dissipated,  as 
when  Faraday  sifted  the  cases  of  table-turning. 

It  is  entirely  different  from  the  evangelical  his- 
tory. We  have  the  testimony  of  four  witnesses  who 
have  all  the  characteristics  of  true  though  sinful 
men,  and  this  confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  an 
educated  man  of  high  intellectual  gifts,  and  by  the 
whole  history  of  the  period,  and  the  successful  propa- 
gation of  the  Gospel  in  the  earlier  ages. 

But  it  is  said  that  in  the  early  ages  people  were 
inclined  to  believe  in  the  supernatural,  and  in- 
vented miracles,  and  that  thus  their  testimony  on 
this  subject  is  not  to  be  credited.  I  admit  the 
premises  but  deny  the  conclusion.  The  people  at 
the  time  of  our  Lord  were  ready  to  believe  in  mira- 
cles. But,  I  add,  not  in  such  miracles  as  are  re- 
corded in  Scripture.  They  are  commonly  great 


124      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

wonders,  monsters  on  earth,  dazzling  lights  in  the 
sky.  They  are  such  as  gratify  the  love  of  wonder 
and  the  superstitions  of  the  heart. 

In  inquiring  of  lawyers  and  of  others  what  is  a 
good  book  on  testimony,  they  refer  me  to  the  works 
of  Dr.  Greenleaf.  He  gives  from  the  start  the  fol- 
lowing rules:  "The  credit  due  to  the  testimony  of 
witnesses  depends  upon,  firstly,  their  honesty; 
secondly,  their  ability ;  thirdly,  their  number  and 
the  consistency  of  their  testimony ;  fourthly,  the 
conformity  of  their  testimony  with  experience,  and 
fifthly,  the  coincidence  of  their  testimony  with  col- 
lateral circumstances."  Let  me  apply  these  rules, 
somewhat  amended,  to  the  testimony,  to  the  life, 
and  especially  the  resurrection,  of  Jesus:  I.  The 
four  evangelists  had  means  of  knowing  what  they 
narrate,  for  they  had  been  for  several  years  in  con- 
stant contact  with  him.  2.  They  were  transparently 
honest,  as  every  man  sees,  and  had  no  motive  to  de- 
ceive, as  by  telling  their  story  they  only  exposed 
themselves  to  persecution.  3.  Their  writings  show 
that  they  had  ability  to  understand  what  they 
narrated.  4.  We  have  these  four  direct  witnesses, 
besides  others,  whose  testimony  spread  the  Gospel 
over  wide  regions.  5*  Their  tale  is  consistent.  There 
is  enough  of  discrepancy  to  show  that  there  could 
have  been  no  previous  concert  among  them,  and,  at 


Testimony.  125 

the  same  time,  such  substantial  agreement  as  to 
show  that  all  were  independent  narrators  of  the 
same  great  transaction  as  the  events  actually  oc- 
curred. 6.  Their  statements  are  all  in  accordance 
with  what  is  told  us  of  the  state  of  Judea  and  the 
world  as  given  us  by  trustworthy  historians  such  as 
Josephus,  the  Jewish,  and  Tacitus,  the  Roman, 
historian. 

I  admit  the  premises,  but  deny  the  conclusion. 
The  people  at  the  time  of  our  Lord  were  ready 
to  believe  in  the  miracles.  But,  I  add,  not  such 
as  are  recorded  in  Scripture.  Historians  and  trav- 
elers tell  us  what  kind  of  miracles  were  invented 
among  the  nations.  As  a  specimen,  take  those 
mentioned  by  Livy,  the  historian,  who  lived  in 
the  age  immediately  before  our  Lord:  ''During 
this  winter,  at  Rome  and  in  its  vicinity,  many 
prodigies  either  happened,  or,  as  is  not  unusual 
when  people's  minds  have  once  taken  a  turn  to- 
ward superstition,  many  were  reported  and  credu- 
lously admitted.  Among  others,  it  was  said,  that  an 
infant  of  a  reputable  family,  and  only  six  months 
old,  had,  in  the  herb-market,  called  out,  '  lo,  Tri- 
umphe ; '  that,  in  the  cattle-market,  an  ox  had,  of 
his  own  accord,  mounted  up  to  the  third  story  of  a 
house,  whence,  being  affrighted  by  the  noise  and 
bustle  of  the  inhabitants,  he  threw  himself  down  ; 


126     The  Tests  of  the   Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

that  a  light  had  appeared  in  the  sky  in  the  form  of 
ships ;  that  the  temple  of  Hope,  in  the  herb-market, 
was  struck  by  lightning ;  that  at  Lanuvium  the 
spear  of  Juno  had  shaken  of  itself ;  and  that  a  crow 
had  flown  into  the  temple  of  Juno  and  pitched  on 
the  very  couch;  that  in  the  district  of  Amiternum, 
in  many  places,  apparitions  of  men  in  white  gar- 
ments had  been  seen  at  a  distance,  but  had  not 
come  close  to  any  body ;  that  in  Picenum  a  shower 
of  stones  had  fallen  ;  at  Caere  the  divining  tickets 
were  diminished  in  size.  In  Gaul  a  wolf  snatched 
the  sword  of  a  soldier  on  guard  out  of  the  scabbard, 
and  ran  away  with  it.  It  rained  blood  in  the  forum 
at  Rome.  The  spear  of  a  statue  of  Mars,  at  Praen- 
este,  moved  out  of  its  place  of  its  own  accord.  An 
ox  spoke  in  Sicily.  An  altar  surrounded  by  men  in 
shining  garments  was  seen  in  the  sky.  Armed  le- 
gions of  spirits  appeared  in  Janiculum."  In  favor  of 
no  one  of  these  have  we  the  testimony  of  a  single 
eye-witness.  They  have  no  worthy  meaning. 

How  different  with  the  miracles  of  our  Lord. 
We  have  the  record  by  those  who  witnessed  them. 
We  have  the  testimony  of  the  four  evangelists, 
evidently  truthful  men,  each  giving  his  own  account, 
and  yet  all  substantially  one. 

Christ's  work,  when  on  earth,  was  a  work  of  salva- 
tion. They  brought  to  him  the  sick,  the  maimed, 


Testimony.  127 

and  the  blind,  and  he  healed  them  all.  If  you  had 
accompanied  Christ  on  some  of  his  pilgrimages 
when  on  earth  what  a  glorious  sight  would  you 
have  seen  !  Not,  indeed,  such  a  sight  as  this  world 
admires  when  it  applauds  the  warrior  with  strong 
and  healthy  men  before  him  whom  it  is  his  pride 
and  glory  to  cut  down  and  destroy.  You  would,  if 
you  had  followed  Christ,  have  seen  a  far  different 
but  a  far  more  glorious  sight.  You  would  have  seen 
before  him,  on  the  way  by  which  he  was  to  pass,  the 
road  covered  with  couches  with  the  sick  laid  out 
upon  them  ;  and  you  would  have  seen  the  dumb, 
when  they  could  not  speak,  striving  to  give  ex- 
pression to  their  woes  by  their  earnest  struggles ; 
and  you  would  have  heard  the  blind,  when  they 
could  not  see  him,  crying  to  be  taken  to  him.  This 

was  the  scene  before  him  ;  and  behind  him,  after  he 

* 

had  passed,  were  the  sick  bearing  their  couches,  and 
the  lame  leaping  like  the  harts,  and  the  dumb  sing- 
ing his  praises,  and  the  blind  gazing  earnestly  upon 
him  with  joyful  eyes,  and  the  lunatics  in  their  right 
minds,  and  those  lately  dead  in  the  embraces  of 
their  friends.  Yes,  these  were  the  fruits  that  fol- 
lowed Christ's  visits  wherever  he  went.  And  he  is 
Jesus  Christ,  the  same  yesterday,  to-day,  and  for- 
ever. His  office,  his  prerogative,  is  still  to  seek  and 
to  save  that  which  is  lost.  He  is  in  this  world  now 


128      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

by  his  Spirit,  as  he  once  was  by  his  bodily  presence. 
He  is  not  to  be  discerned  by  any  pomp  or  external 
splendor.  The  kingdom  of  God  cometh  not  by 
observation  ;  but  still  we  may  discern  him  by  the 
eye  of  faith.  Before  him  are  persons  afflicted  with 
all  manner  of  soul  maladies:  some  under  the  power 
of  wild  passion,  by  which  they  are.  led  captive  at 
pleasure,  some  covered  all  over  with  the  leprosy  of 
vice,  all  of  them  blind  to  the  perception  of  spiritual 
beauty  and  deaf  to  the  voice  of  God  addressed  to 
them.  Wherever  Christ  goes  the  way  is  strewn 
with  such ;  and  wherever  he  goes  he  leaves  behind 
him  traces  of  his  presence.  Before  him,  as  he 
marches  through  our  world,  are  the  blind,  the  deaf, 
the  dying,  and  the  dead  ;  and  behind  him  are  the 
seeing,  the  hearing,  the  living,  the  lovely,  and  the 
loving.  "The  Spirit  of  the  Lord  God  is  upon  me; 
because  the  Lord  hath  anointed  me  to  preach  good 
tidings  unto  the  meek;  he  hath  sent  me  to  bind  up 
the  broken-hearted,  to  proclaim  liberty  to  the  cap- 
tives, and  the  opening  of  the  prison  to  them  that 
are  bound  ;  to  proclaim  the  acceptable  year  of  the 
Lord." 

The  witnesses  were  plain,  unsophisticated  men. 
Then  we  have  the  declaration  of  one  of  the  great 
men  of  the  world,  altogether  independent  of  his 
inspiration — a  scholar,  a  writer,  an  actor  of  great 


Testimony.  129 

practical  wisdom.  Paul,  once  so  strongly  preju- 
diced against  the  Crucified,  assures  us  that  he  saw 
Christ  in  the  flesh,  and  that  he  was  overcome  by 
him.  The  Arnolds  evidently  feel  a  sensitive  shrink- 
ing from  the  honest,  sturdy,  outspoken  apostle. 
The  novelist  tells  us  he  was  no  reasoner.  Those 
who  can  reason  themselves  know  that  in  the  Ro- 
mans, and  in  all  his  epistles,  he  is  one  of  the  most 
powerful  reasoners  that  ever  put  together  premises 
and  conclusions.  At  times  he  makes  a  digression, 
but  it  is  as  a  man  who  steps  back  a  few  feet  that 
he  may  gather  force  to  clear  the  chasm. 

Every  man  who  reads  the  gospels  has  a  miracle 
set  before  him  in  the  discourses  of  our  Lord,  which, 
for  sublime  doctrine  and  pure  precept,  for  grace 
and  elevation  of  sentiment,  for  faithfulness  and  for 
pathos  and  for  tenderness,  for  indignation  against 
sin  and  pity  for  the  sinner,  for  knowledge  of  the 
human  heart,  and  love  to  men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren, transcend  all  the  highest  intellects  have  done 
in  Greece  and  Rome,  and,  as  spoken  by  a  Galilean 
peasant,  are  themselves  a  miracle. 

The  common  Christian  has  not  just  to  prove  a 
miracle  against  an  infidel.  All  that  he  has  to  do 
for  his  own  conviction  is  to  find  that  Christianity 
came  from  uneducated  men  in  Galilee.  This 

granted,    the    miracle    follows ;     and    he    is    con- 
9 


130      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

strained   to   say,   "Thou   hast    conquered    me,   O 
Galilean." 

VI. 

"  What  think  you  of  Christ  ?  Whose  Son  is  he  ?  " 
We  are  obliged  to  think  of  him,  and  we  have  to 
answer  the  question,  "Whose  Son  is  he?  Whence 
does  he  come?"  We  may  suppose  that  he,  a 
mechanic  in  Galilee,  uttered  all  these  truths,  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount,  and  the  parables,  and  we 
have  already  a  miracle.  Or,  if  we  may  adopt  a 
more  refined  theory,  and  suppose  that  there  was  a 
wonderful  carpenter's  son  in  Nazareth,  and  that  a 
body  of  fishermen  on  the  lake  constructed  the  Life 
of  Christ  out  of  him,  we  have  a  still  more  astound- 
ing miracle,  with  nothing  resembling  it  in  the  his-, 
tory  of  the  world. 

Take  one  supernatural  event — the  resurrection  of 
Jesus.  We  have  as  full  proof  of  it  as  of  any  event 
in  ancient  history — say  the  death  of  Julius  Caesar, 
which  every  one  believes  in.  We  have  as  clear  evi- 
dence that  these  four  evangelists  wrote  the  gospels 
as  that  Xenophon  wrote  the  memoirs  of  Socrates. 
But  the  grand  proof  of  the  truth  of  our  religion 
lies  in  the  combination  of  evidence.  We  have  a 
treble  cord,  which  cannot  be  broken.  How  have 
men  of  science  established  the  doctrine  of  the 
uniformity  of  nature  ?  By  an  accumulation  and 


Testimony.  131 

combination  of  observations  in  all  departments  of 
nature.     It  is  in  the  same  way  that  we  prove  that 
there  is  a  supernatural  system  in  the  midst  of  the 
natural,   and  fitting  into  it.     Round  the  life  and 
death  and  resurrection  of  Jesus  we  have  a  body  of 
conspiring  evidences.     There  were  antecedents  and 
there  are  consequents.     We  have  the  anticipation 
in  the  history,  types,  and  prophecies  of  the  Old 
Testament.    Then  we  have  the  results  flowing  from 
the  belief  in  the  resurrection  of  Christ,  the  preach- 
ing of  the  Gospel,  the  spread  of  Christianity  in  all 
countries,  the  production  and  fostering  of  all  that  is 
good  in  art  and  history,  in  the  elevation  of  morals, 
in  the  establishment  of  schools  and  colleges  and 
hospitals,    in   raising    the   status    of    the   working 
classes,    in    the    comfort    imparted    to    poor    and 
afflicted  ones,  in  the  converting  power  of  the  grace 
of  God,  in  the  slaves  of  the  wildest  passions  sitting 
at  the  feet  of  Jesus  clothed  and  in  their  right  mind. 
All  these  constitute,  from  first  to  last,  a  unity,  a 
system ;    he  who  would  overthrow  it  will  have  to 
attack,  not  the  mere  outposts,  but  the  consistent 
whole.     It  is  a  bounteous  river  system — with  its 
waters  flowing  over  the  waste  places  of  the  earth, 
but  issuing  from  the  throne  of  God  in  heaven. 

All    these    miracles    are    worthy    of    God    and 
adapted  to  the  state  of  man  ;  with  a  few  exceptions 


132      The  Tests  of  the  Various  Kinds  of  Truth. 

they  are  wrought  to  deliver  from  pressing  evils  in 
our  world,  from  disease,  from  sorrow,  from  sin. 
The  grand  end  of  the  whole  is  the  redemption  of 
the  soul,  for  which  the  great  men  of  the  world  have 
labored,  but  have  failed  of  their  end. 

Nor  let  it  be  urged  that  the  Jewish  and  heathen 
worlds  were  so  predisposed  toward  the  miraculous 
that  the  early  Christians  had  only  to  proclaim  it  to 
find  all  men  believing  it.  For  it  is  to  be  remem- 
bered that  the  Gentiles  got  it  from  the  Jews  whom 
they  hated,  and  the  Jews  from  the  Galileans  whom 
they  despised. 

More  persuasive,  if  not  more  convincing,  we  have 
what  are  called  the  internal  evidences  :  the  suitable- 
ness of  Christianity  to  man's  nature  and  wants,  to 
his  felt  weakness,  and  his  sinfulness,  for  which  an 
atonement  has  been  provided  ;  as  bringing  life  and 
immortality  to  light,  and  as  rolling  away  the  great 
stone  that  closed  the  tomb,  and  opening  the  grave 
that  the  spirit  may  arise  to  heaven. 


